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ABSTRACT 
ORIGINS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO IN THE CONTEXT OF 
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN (1938-1950) 
Gonzalez Sosa, Francisco J, M.A. Mankato State University. Mankato, 
Minnesota. 1995. 80pp. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the political and military 
considerations that provided the frame of reference for the promulgation of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952. Since 1492 possession of this island 
has been coveted by nations with vital interest in the Caribbean region. To the 
United States, who conquered the island in 1898, Puerto Rico formed the 
backbone of the defense perimeter for the Panama Canal and adjacent 
shipping lanes. Experience during World War 11 and the subsequent threat from 
the Soviet Union reinforced the military value of the island. The importance of 
the geostrategic location of the island to the United States was the crucial factor 
that determined the type of political system that substituted fifty years of U.S. 
colonial rule with a measure of self-government. The leadership of Lufs Munoz 
Marfn and the moderate ideology of his Partido Popular Democratico (Popular 
Democratic Party) proved to be the best vehicle for the implementation of the 
reforms that would guarantee both the preservation of U.S. sovereignty over 
Puerto Rico and the improvement of the welfare of the people of the island. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Island of Puerto Rico is located in the middle of the Antillean 
archipelago that runs between Florida and South America. With a territorial 
extension of only 3,423 square miles, Puerto Rico is the smallest of the Greater 
Antilles which also includes the islands of Cuba, Jamaica and Hispaniola. The 
mountainous terrain is the dominant topographic feature, while the tropical 
climate and abundant rainfall provide an ideal environment for many species of 
plants. However, due to the isolation from the continental land masses, Puerto 
Rico contains few native animal species (mostly reptiles and birds). These 
factors influenced the economic development and the pattern of settlement that 
evolved on the island. 1 
The first evidence of humans in the Greater Antilles date from around the 
1st. century AD, when groups of hunter-gatherers, believed to have come from 
the Florida Peninsula, settled along the coasts and rivers of the islands. Latter 
arrivals were the Arawak or Taino Indians who emigrated into the area from the 
northern coast of South America around the year 500 AD, eventually displacing 
the earlier inhabitants. The Arawak were-Elf) agricultural people ,with a relatively 
complex social organization. They were the first Native Americans encountered 
by Christopher Columbus when he landed in Guanahanf (San Salvador, one of 
the Bahamas Islands) on October 12, 1492. 
During his next voyage to the Caribbean, Columbus landed on Boriquen 
(the Arawak name for Puerto Rico) on November 19, 1493. The explorer 
' For a review of the history of Puerto Rico until 1898, see Loida Figueroa, Breve historia de 
Puerto Rico, 2 vols. (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Edil, 1979). 
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claimed possession of the island for the Kingdom of Spain, but did not establish 
any outpost or try to investigate the interior. No attempts were made to colonize 
the island until 1508, when Juan Ponce de Leon built a fort near present-day 
San Juan. Ponce de Leon befriended Ag0eybana, a powerful chieftain in 
Boriquen, and relations between the Spanish newcomers and the Arawaks 
were at first cordial. The colonists dedicated themselves mostly to the mining of 
gold which they found in limited supply. As gold output dwindled, the colonists 
increased their increased demands for land, food and forced labor from the 
indigenous inhabitants. Such exploitation ignited an Indian revolt in 151 0 that 
was put down with difficulty. Many among the defeated Arawaks withdrew into 
the mountains of the interior while others left to join the Carib Indians who lived 
in the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, still free of European domination. 
The period following the Arawak uprising was characterized, paradoxically, 
by the rapid decline of the Spanish settlements in Puerto Rico. The Spaniards 
left because they exhausted the gold deposits and decimated their Indian labor 
force. The Arawaks died in large numbers as a result of the spread of diseases, 
overwork and destruction of their social order. African slaves were introduced in 
1513, mostly to work in the fledging sugar cane plantations, but they could not 
completely satisfy the need for labor. The news of the conquest of Mexico and 
Peru produced a severe loss of population, as many settlers abandoned the 
island for the greater riches of the new parts of the Spanish empire. 
Despite the lack of economic importance and rapid depopulation, the 
Spanish government understood the strategic value of Puerto Rico as a 
military outpost for protecting the Armadas, the galleon fleets that every year 
sailed from Panama carrying valuable cargo from South America and Mexico to 
Spain. Other European nations also realized the advantages of controlling 
4 
Puerto Rico and, beginning with the French in 1528, launched intermittent 
attacks on the island. In response the Spanish authorities commenced to build 
a series of fortresses to defend San Juan, the main port and city. Due to the 
poor state of the economy local taxes alone could not finance the military 
constructions and support the garrison, and in 1582 a subsidy from the Mexican 
treasury (the situado), was authorized to pay the cost of defending Puerto Rico. 
The fact that the island was an economic liability to the treasury was more than 
compensated by the military advantage it gave the Spanish against the 
European rivals encroaching into their territories. 
These defenses were tested time and again by continued attacks from the 
English (the notorious Francis Drake in 1595 and the Earl of Cumberland in 
1598), the Dutch (in 1625) and assorted pirate raids during the next two 
centuries. By the end of the 18th century the defenses of San Juan consisted of 
a wall around the entire city, the large fortresses of San Felipe del Morro and 
San Cristobal and several smaller redoubts (San Antonio, San Geronimo and 
Isla de Cabras), all garrisoned by around 2,500 regular troops with ample 
artillery. 
The emphasis on the military readiness did not translate into an 
improvement of the economic and social situation of the island. Small-scale 
production of sugar, tobacco, ginger, rice and assorted tropical fruits generated 
only limited income. Hides and salted meat also became important exports 
during the seventeen and eighteen centuries, mostly to supply passing ships. 
But again, the income was meager. Compared to the gold and silver producing 
zones of the mainland, Puerto Rico became a marginal area in the Spanish 
empire. 
However, during this period of isolation and backwardness, the people of 
.J 
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Puerto Rico developed distinct cultural and ethnic characteristics. Spanish 
intermarriage with the Arawaks and with the African slaves gave rise to a 
racially mixed population. Although modified by the incorporation of Indian and 
African traits, Spanish culture remained predominant. Spaniards imposed their 
religion, government and economic system on the island. High officials in the 
Church and government, plus wealthy merchants and landowners occupied the 
privileged positions in society. The poor consisted of free peasants, slave 
plantations laborers and marginal day laborers. 
The United States War of Independence (1775-1783) and the French 
Revolution (1789) set the stage for a series of profound social, political and 
economic changes in Spain and across the Spanish empire in the Americas. 
The sugar industry in Puerto Rico developed in earnest, as well as the 
production of coffee. Liberalization of the rigid trade policies increased exports 
to not only the the rest of the Spanish empire, but also to the new markets of the 
United States. The improving economy and the intellectual influence of the 
revolutions in North America and Europe contributed to a more precise 
definition of Puerto Ricans as distinct people. This sentiment was enhanced by 
the defeat in 1797 of a final British attempt to conquer the island. During the 
battle the local militia claimed their share of the victory when they rescued the 
outnumbered regular Spanish garrison. Despite their victory, however, a Creole 
move toward reform and autonomy was cut short by other developments. 
The outbreak of the Wars of Independence in Mexico and South America in 
181 O ironically strengthened the ties of the island to Spain. Many royalists fled 
to the island from Venezuela, Peru and Mexico, bringing not only their property 
and skills but also their unconditional pro-Spanish allegiance. By 1824 the 
Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere comprised only Cuba and Puerto 
6 
Rico. Once the mainland had become independent, the elaborate fortifications 
on the island suddenly became obsolete. Rather than be concerned about 
external threats, the military garrison in Puerto Rico began to worry more about 
internal unrest. Since the colonial authorities viewed any requests for reforms 
with suspicion, they blocked even minor changes. The governor, always a 
military man appointed by the Crown, had almost unlimited powers to rule by 
decree. Furthermore, the fear that the political unrest in Spain would reach 
Puerto Rico also worked against the development of reform in the 
administration of the colonies. 2 
By the late nineteenth century the reformists elements among the Puerto 
Rican political leadership managed to obtain from Spain the granting of greater 
powers of self-government. The Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter) of 1897 
allowed for the election of a legislative body who was in control of virtually all 
aspects of the administration of the island, except for matters of defense and 
some international relations. The Spanish government granted the requests for 
reform to Puerto Rico to avoid a repetition of the unrest in Cuba, where a violent 
rebellion launched to achieve the independence of that island began in 1895. 
The Carta Auton6mica was also extended to Cuba, in the hope that this would 
help pacify the country, but the main revolutionary forces there would not agree 
to anything short of total independence from Spain. 
These reforms were hardly in place when the coming of the Spanish-
American War forever changed the island. Following the declaration of war on 
April 25, 1898, between Spain and the United States over the Cuban 
2 Between 1833 and 1878 Spain experienced two major civil wars, several regional 
insurrections and coups, the substitution of the Queen by an Italian prince, this followed by the 
proclamation of a republic, before reverting again to a constitutional monarchy. For more 
information see Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de Espaf"la e influencia en la historia 
universal. (Barcelona, Spain: Salvat, S.A., 1943). 
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independence issue, Puerto Rico was subjected again to attack by a foreign 
power, this time a stronger nation than those of past centuries. After a 
short campaign, most of the island was occupied by U.S. forces and eventually 
ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. This agreement initiated the 
close political, cultural and economic relationship between Puerto Rico and the 
United States which continues to the present. From the earliest days of the new 
rule over the island, however, it became clear that, despite the hopes of the 
leading politicians and civic leaders in Puerto Rico, the United States presence 
was not a prelude to independence but merely the exchange of one colonial 
master for another. 
From 1900 to 1940 the United States lacked a coherent policy toward the 
island. Debate among U.S. functionaries centered on the issue of eventual 
statehood for Puerto Rico. Some felt that after a period of cultural and political 
"Americanization" this could be accomplished. while others pointed out that the 
racial and cultural differences were too strong and the economy of the island 
too weak to warrant incorporation into the Union. Symptomatic of this 
ambivalence was the fact that U.S. citizenship was not granted to Puerto Ricans 
until 1917, at the same time that a very limited form of self government (the 
Jones Act) was introduced. The Jones Act was designed to substitute the 
Spanish laws still in effect. While granting some powers to a legislative body, 
the governor (appointed by the President) could not only veto any legislative 
actions but could, in effect, rule by decree. The Federal government, both 
Congress and the President, retained control over most economic and 
administrative affairs of the island. The political parties that developed in Puerto 
Rico during this period were mostly concerned with changing the colonial 
relationship between the U.S. and the island by achieving either statehood or 
8 
independence. 
At the end of World War II the status situation of Puerto Rico became a 
dilemma to U.S. policy makers. For the United States to maintain a colonial 
possession provided the Soviet Union with an important propaganda weapon 
which the Soviet delegates to the United Nations did not hesitate to use. But at 
the same time the U.S. considered Puerto Rico a strategic asset, whose military 
installations proved to be very valuable during the war, and that were expected 
to be employed again in case of a similar attack from the Soviet Union. For this 
reason, the U.S. military wanted to retain unrestricted control of the island. This 
dilemma was solved by the emergence of a new political force, Lufs Munoz 
Marfn and his Partido Popular DemocraticQ (Popular Democratic Party), that 
succesfully steered Puerto Rico toward the present Commonwealth status, a 
form of political autonomy which was acceptable to most Puerto Ricans as well 
as to the United States. The genesis of this Commonwealth position and how 
the Puerto Rican leaders involved in this process found common ground with 
U.S. military and political officials will be the focus of this paper. 
Several publications dealing with the origins of the Commonwealth have 
focused on the political process in both Washington and Puerto Rico, the 
juridical and constitutional issues that guided the development of this formula, 
or the socio-economic background of the relationship between the island and 
the U.S., without describing the reasons why the U.S. was concerned with 
maintaining a presence in Puerto Rico. The climate of confrontation with the 
Soviet Union and how that was perceived by U.S. policymakers helped to 
shape to a considerable degree the development of the Commonwealth 
alternative. Gordon K. Lewis in his influential book Puerto Rico: Freedom and 
i 
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Power in the Caribbean3 sets out to describe both the societal evolution in the 
island since 1898 and also how the resulting model of Puerto Rican-U.S. 
relations fits into the changing world of nationalist and decolonization 
movements then (1963) sweeping not only the Caribbean area but much of the 
developing world. 
The author states that : 
(t]he Puerto Rican experience ... raises problems of some urgency in the 
modern world ... Is the welfare-state ideology (all contemporary 
nationalist movements espouse it) in itself sufficient to withstand the 
emergence of a Westernized class society ... ? Will the new colonial 
nationalisms repeat the errors of Western nationalism? Can 'democracy' 
emerge and survive in situations profoundly different from those 
surrounding its original rise in England, France and the United States? .. 
What fresh relationships between politics and culture will arise?4 
Lewis regards the process that led to the proclamation of the 
Commonwealth in 1952 "as simply the end result of of a sixty-year old process 
whereby Congress has progressively handed over successive shares of the 
Congressional governing power to the island,"5 at the same time retaining the 
power to revoke all laws approved by the Commonwealth, including the 
Constitution of 1952 itself. Concluding that Puerto Rico remains basically a 
U.S. colony, Lewis indicates that only independence could allow Puerto Rico to 
fully develop socially and economically. The author, however does not discuss 
the national interests (political, economic or military) that compelled the U.S. to 
maintain the final say on all matters regarding Puerto Rico. 
Arturo Morales Carrion reviews the advent of the Commonwealth in his 
3 Gordon K. Lewis. Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1963). 
4 Ibid., 22. 
5 Ibid., 415. 
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comprehensive work Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History giving a 
detailed account of the political career of Lufs Munoz Marfn and the rise of his 
Partido Popular Democratico. and how the desire for social and economic 
reform in Puerto Rico supported the overhaul of the colonial political system 
then in place. Morales Carrion also describes the attitude in Congress to the 
various proposals made during the 1940's to achieve such reform. He explains 
as well how the strategic military location of Puerto Rico during World War II 
shaped the political discourse during the war. The author, however, does not 
present the continuing military importance of the island after 1945 as one of the 
driving factors behind the granting of Commonwealth status. Instead, he 
focuses on the political need to accommodate the situation of Puerto Rico to the 
post-war impetus toward ending colonialism: 
[i]f in 1940-1945 Puerto Rico had played the role of a Caribbean Malta. from 
1952 onwards it became a bastion of democratic thought and action in the 
Caribbean. Many in the Caribbean and in Latin America traditionally favored 
independence; but others admired the way Munoz and his associates were 
transforming a heritage of poverty and want while progressively achieving 
growing powers vis-a-visthe most powerful nation in the world. 1 
The author's main point is that after the approval of the Commonwealth, the 
United States was able to convince many Latin American countries that Puerto 
Rico no longer was a colony but an equal partner in an association with the 
U.S. With their support, the U.S. managed to have the island withdrawn from 
the United Nations list of colonial territories, an important diplomatic success. 
The essays collected in Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy' and 
edited by Richard J. Bloomfield represent the range of ideological opinions 
6 Arturo Morales Carrion, Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., Inc., 1983). 
1 Ibid., 282. 
s Richard J. Bloomfield, ed., Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy, (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1985). 
i. 
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regarding the development of the Commonwealth status. The editor indicates 
the relevance the political situation of Puerto Rico " . . . as it represents a 
dichotomy between American ideals and institutional reality. Puerto Rico is an 
anomaly in the U.S. political system."° Characterizing the island as a colony, he 
contends that because the U.S. succeeded in removing the island from the 
United Nations' list of non self-governing territories in 1953 does not mean that 
the status situation was permanently resolved. This is the common thread that 
runs through all the issues presented by all the contributors to this book. 
The editor contends that the Commonwealth formula was the product of a 
compromise that would simultaneously satisfy the diplomatic needs of the U.S. 
(i.e, at the United Nations and to improve relations with Latin America), the 
desire of Congress to maintain ultimate control over the island, and the genuine 
desire for political self-determination a:id economic improvement that the 
people of Puerto Rico demanded. Such an arrangement was bound to face 
opposition sooner or latter as the original premises upon which the compromise 
was crafted changed or became obsolete. For example, the economy of Puerto 
Rico in 1980 was totally different from that of 1940, and the focus of U.S. policy 
toward Latin America shifted from a desire to obtain diplomatic support at the 
U.N. to striving to defeat leftist revolutionary movements in Central and South 
America. However, neither the editor nor the contributors comment on the role 
that the island has as the key link in the defense perimeter of the United States 
against any possible Soviet military incursions in the Caribbean region. 
Gerardo Navas Davila in La dialectica en el desarrollo nacional: el caso de 
Puerto Rico 10 presents another interpretation of the path that eventually led to 
9 Ibid., 1. 
10 Gerardo Navas Davila, La dialectica del desarrollo nacional: el caso de Puerto Rico. (Rio 
Piedras, Puerto Rico, Editorial Universitaria, 1978). 
12 
the establishment of the Commonwealth. The author describes the national 
character, the concepts of identity and national conscience, of Puerto Rico as 
determining factors in the formulation of the Commonwealth status as the 
pragmatic ideological solution to the colonial system created by the U.S. since 
1898. In this analysis the strategic and military value of the island is at best of 
secondary concern to the economic aspect of the U.S.-Puerto Rican 
relationship. Navas Davila proposes that until 1947 Lufs Munoz Marfn and the 
Partido Popular Democratico were really trying to improve the economic and 
social picture of Puerto Rico and terminate the stranglehold that U.S. owned 
companies had on the sugar industry (the main economic activity}, in order to 
prepare the island ultimately for political independence. The author states that 
"[f]aced with an American imperialism that, while "tame" on political issues, was 
'aggressive,' 'crafty' and 'intelligent' on economic issues, Munoz realizes the 
impossibmty of an economically viable independence" 11 (this author's 
translation). 
To Navas Davila the creation of the Commonwealth is the product of the 
need to respond to the concerns of both U.S. interests and local elites, and to 
preserve their economic power by allowing a degree of political autonomy at 
the same time that ultimate control remained in U.S. hands. The reason why 
Munoz Marfn accepted this arrangement is because he was certain that this 
was the only achievable alternative to the status quo. 
In contrast to the above positions, this work will concentrate on the place of 
Puerto Rico in the Cold War. The Commonwealt~, option satisfied U.S. leaders 
because they retained sovereignty over the island and direct access to 
11 
"Frente a un imperialismo americano que, aunque "bobo" en lo politico, era "agresivo", 
"habil" e "inteligente" en lo econ6mico, Munoz admite la imposibilidad de una independencia 
econ6micamente viable.", Ibid., 98. 
13 
important military bases. The Commonwealth option also provided enough 
autonomy to minimize the accusations of colonialism hurled at the U.S. from the 
Soviets and others at the United Nations. On the other hand, Luis Munoz Marin 
accepted the Commonwealth because it provided an opportunity to concentrate 
on the island's social and economic problems. Under the Commonwealth, 
Puerto Ricans might still shape their own society. To Munoz Marin complete 
independence would have been to costly to achieve and thus would have 
undermined programs for the alleviation of poverty. 
14 
CHAPTER II 
INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
Even before the end of the hostilities in Europe in 1945, the United States 
and the Soviet Union had already begun to shift their policies, from wartime 
allies to future adversaries. 1 The onset of the Cold War between 1945 and 1948 
was marked with events that included the Berlin blockade, the civil war in 
Greece, the Soviet-sponsored unrest in Turkey and Iran, the triumph of 
Communism in China and the continuing repression of the Eastern European 
countries then under Soviet occupation. In 1946 and 1947 U.S. President 
Harry S. Truman granted military aid to Greece and Turkey in order to stop any 
Communist take-over of those weak states. This small beginning led to a world-
wide policy of "containment", which the U.S. maintained for the next 45 years. 2 
U.S. military supplies, training and economic aid were sent to the war-torn 
countries of Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the places where 
conflict with the Soviet Union was most likely to take place. However, the 
international situation was further complicated by the rising tide of nationalism 
and demand for independence emanating from the crumbling European 
colonial empires. In Africa, the Americas and Asia, the demands for recognition 
of the national identities of the colonial territories were common and rapidly 
increasing. This trend toward sovereignty and the end of foreign rule over large 
areas of the world first became evident in Southeast Asia, where strong pro-
1 Martin F. Herz, The Beginning of the Cold War. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1966), 130-140. 
2 Miroslav Nincic, United States Foreign Policy: Choices and Tradeoffs (New York: CQ, Inc .. 
1988), 31-35. 
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independence movements were active. The Philippines obtained their 
independence from the United States on July 4, 1946., as previously agreed 
before World War 11.3 In 1947 Britain dismantled their Viceroyalty of India and 
stood aside as nationalists forces created the states of India, Pakistan, Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka), and Burma (Myanmar). In the Dutch East Indies a guerrilla 
campaign against the Netherlands resulted in the granting of independence in 
1949 to the Republic of Indonesia. The most violent and tragic episode of this 
period, was the the large-scale warfare that erupted in 1946 in Indochina 
between the Vietnamese and the ruling French authorities. Following these 
examples, nationalist leaders in Africa and the Americas also demanded self-
determination. The United States policy in this post-war era sought to balance 
the demands of Cold War distrust for revolutionary unrest, that might be 
exploited by the Soviets, with the ideological commitment and sympathy felt 
toward colonial societies wanting political self-determination. Also, as all the 
colonial powers were allies or close friends of the U.S., President Truman did 
not want to undermine their positions, even if the United States was openly 
critical of colonialism. 4 
This overall strategic situation was reflected in the debate on how to 
proceed regarding any proposed modifications to the current political 
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. The possibility that the 
naval and air installations in the island might not be available in case of a 
global conflict with the Soviet Union, was a major concern for U.S. military 
planners. The reason for the continued importance of the Puerto Rican facilities 
3 This was approved by Congress with the passage of the Tydings-Mcduffy Act in 1934,. See 
Carmelo Rosario Natal, Lufs Munoz Marfn y la independencia de Puerto Rico (1907-1946}. (San 
Juan: Puerto Rico, First Book Publishing, 1994) 80-82 
4 Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years:The Presidency of ~S. Truman, 1945-1953. 
(New York: Norton, 1982) 22-23. 
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was the Soviet Navy's post-war emphasis on submarine warfare and the role 
that submarines expected to play in a confrontation with the United States . 
. The U.S. military was influenced by the course of operations during World 
War II, and by the actions of German U-Boats (submarines) in the Caribbean 
and Middle Atlantic in particular. After Germany declared war on the U.S., 
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Admiral 
Donitz, commander of the U-Boat service, set into motion Operation 
Paukenschlag (Drumbeat), a raid by 5 submarines against Allied shipping 
along the Eastern seaboard of the U.S that between January 12 and February 
6, 1942, sank 25 merchant ships. 5 This was followed in March of the same year 
by Operation Neyland, the attempted destruction by U-Boats of the oil refinery at 
the island of Aruba, largest in the world and critical for the processing of crude 
oil from Curacao and Venezuela. 0 During the first six months of 1942, the U-
Boat offensive resulted in the loss of 397 ships sunk in the home waters of the 
U.S. Navy.1 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, whose country depended 
on overseas supplies, was alarmed at these losses and wrote to U. S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 12, 1942 stating: 
The situation is so serious that a drastic action of some kind is necessary, and 
we very much hope that you will be able to provide additional escort forces to 
organize immediate convoys in the West Indies-Bermuda area by 
withdrawing a few of your destroyer strength from the Pacific. e 
U.S. strategists were also extremely concerned with these developments. 
In June of 1942 General George Marshall wrote to Admiral King, who was in 
charge of U.S. Navy operations in the Atlantic, about the effects of the German 
5 Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1990), 296 
6 Cesar de Windt Lavandier. La Sequnda Guerra Mundial y_los submarinos alemanes en el 
Caribe. (San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic: Ediciones U.C.E., 1982). 72-76. 
1 Gannon. Operation. 388-389 
6 Lieut. Col. Eddy Bauer. ed. Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia (Westport, Connecticut: 
H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978), vol. 6, 730. 
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attacks: 
The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean 
now threaten our entire war effort. The following statistics bearing on the 
subject have been brought to my attention: Of the 7 4 ships allocated to the 
Army for July by the War Shipping Administration, 17 have already been 
sunk.22% of the bauxite fleet has already been destroyed. 20% of the Puerto 
Rican fleet has been /ost(emphasis added). Tanker sinkings have been 3.5% 
per month of tonnage in use. We are all aware of the limited number of escort 
craft available, but has every every conceivable improvised means been 
brought to bear on this situation? I am fearful that another month of two of this 
will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient 
men and planes to bear against the enemy in critical theaters to exercise a 
determining influence on the war.9 
The tide finally began to turn against the U-Boats by 1943, due to a 
combination of factors: improved coordination between U.S. and Allied forces, 
increased number of aircraft and ships for patrol and convoy escort duties, 
introduction of advanced technologies such as radar and sonar for the detection 
of submarines, availability of intelligence derived from the breaking of the 
ENIGMA code (allowing the Allies to read secret German military messages), 
increased production of ships in the U.S. to replace losses, and the construction 
of a series of military bases in the Caribbean and South America to provide 
continued protection to Allied ships in the region. 10 
The fact was that the United States in 1941 and 1942 was caught 
unprepared to meet the U-Boat threat, and that most of the naval forces 
available at the time were diverted to the war against Japan in the Pacific with 
few left for Atlantic duty. Also, the U.S. could not completely count on the help 
from Britain, its only ally with a significant navy, whose forces were already 
stretched to the limit in other theaters of war. This weakness of the U.S. forces 
in the Caribbean at this time raised the prospect of a German invasion of the 
9 Ibid, 730. 
10 Richard Natkiel, AtlasofThe 20th Century, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982), 156-157. 
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islands as a steppingstone for an attack against either Latin America or the U.S. 
itself. The U-Boat exploits were also a great asset for German propaganda 
efforts aimed at encouraging the always latent anti-U.S. sentiments among 
many sectors of the Latin American population. To coordinate those efforts the 
Germans utilized the Spanish fascist Falanga organization. 11 
After World War II the U.S. planned for a possible repetition of a large-scale 
submarine offensive, but this time launched by from the Soviet Navy. The U.S. 
was aware that the Soviets had concluded that, while they possessed strong 
land and air forces, their naval strength compared to that of the Western Allies 
was insignificant. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin decided on a program to build a 
modern navy, but realizing that this would take years to complete, he ordered 
the creation of a strong submarine force (using captured German technology) 
as a way to have a credible naval offensive capability in the interim. 12 
Soviet naval planners had studied closely German U-Boat operations, and 
were aware of their devastating effects on Allied shipping. Admiral Sergei 
Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, described the impact of the 
German submarines on the disposition of the numerically-superior Allied 
navies: 
More than 2,000 British and American anti-submarine warfare combatants 
and specially configured merchantmen and several thousand aircraft were in 
operation against the German U-Boats in the Atlantic Theater. For each 
German U-Boat, there were 25 British and U.S. warships and 100 aircraft, 
and for every German submariner at sea there were 100 British and American 
anti-submariners. A total of six million men were thrown into the 
antisubmarine war. One can hardly find a similar ratio of attacking to 
defending forces among all the other branches of the armed forces! 13 
11 For more information see Allan Chase, Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the Americas. (New 
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1943). 
12 Stewart Menaul, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Strategy, Tactics, and Weapons of 
Russian Military Power, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1980), 97-99. 
13 Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, Red Star Rising At Sea. (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1974), 100. 
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In his final analysis of the submarine war, Adm. Gorshkov concluded that 
the main reason why the U-Boats ultimately failed to stop the flow of supplies 
across the Atlantic was that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the 
submarine and had not built enough units at the start of the war to press their 
initial success. Time proved to be on the side of the Allies, allowing them to 
develop countermeasures to defeat the U-Boats. 14 The Soviet Navy was 
determined not to make this same mistake, and had an inventory of close to 300 
submarines by the early 1950's. 15 
In view of the increased demands tor the deployment of military forces and 
economic resources in other areas of the world where confrontation with the 
Soviets appeared imminent, the U.S. decided to shoreup its position in Latin 
America and the Caribbean by increasing its political and military ties to the 
countries of the region. An "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of 
Peace and Security'' was held from August 15 to September 2, 1947, at 
Petr6polis in Brazil, attended by representatives of 21 American states for the 
purpose of dratting a treaty of collective self-defense for the Western 
Hemisphere. The resulting Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the 
Rio Pact, was signed on September 2, 1947, and stated that all parties to the 
treaty were obliged to come to the assistance of any state in the Hemisphere in 
case of an attack. 16 To complement the Rio Pact, the U.S. Congress approved 
the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, that allowed the sale of surplus military 
equipment to countries in Latin America. 11 It was expected that these 
14 Adm. Gorshkov, fu&Star, 108. 
15 Menaul, Russian Military Power. 99. 
16 Raymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations. 
vol. ix (Boston: Princeton University Press, 1949), 531-540. 
11 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, selected Executive Session 
Hearings of the Committee, 1943-1950. vol. 6, Military Assistance Programs, Part 2 (Washington. 
D.C., U.S. Printing Office, 1976), 50-64. 
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agreements would result in the improvement of Latin American armed forces to 
defend their territories against foreign aggressors safeguarding the raw 
materials and strategic shipping lanes (like the Panama Canal) vital to U.S. 
industries and lessening the need for the deployment of U.S. forces to 
accomplish these tasks. 18 
On the wider diplomatic front, the U.S. was also concerned with the 
utilization of the newly-created (1945) United Nations Organization as a forum 
for the debate over the future of colonial territories and, as the decolonization 
movement gained momentum, this issue came to the forefront of discussions. 
The United Nations Charter included three chapters dealing with these 
territories. Chapters XI, XII and XIII outlined the duties and obligations of 
colonial powers toward subject territories, and the mechanisms to encourage 
more autonomy for the same with the purpose of achieving eventual 
independence. 10 Under the terms of the UN Charter, the United States was 
compelled to submit periodic reports on the conditions of its territories (which by 
1946, included Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, 
Samoa, and the former Japanese possessions in the Marianas and Marshall 
island groups in the Pacific). Many officials resented this outside intervention in 
the internal affairs of the U.S. 20 They also maintained that these territories were 
not oppressed and in fact had prospered under U.S. rule, thus rationalizing that 
the United States was not really a "colonial'' power. 
The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries also joined the emerging 
,e Ibid., 471-475. 
19 Duties of The United Nations Trusteeship Council included gathering information and 
monitoring the development of these territories. See United Nations. TIP. V.1, March 26, 1947. 
20 This was the a commonly held opinion among government, business, educational and 
church circles that had any contact or interest in these U.S. dependencies (see Rexford G. 
Tugwell, The Stricken Land, 20-25 and elsewhere: and Theodore Roosevelt, Colonial Policies of 
the United States (New York: Arno Press, 1930). 
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nations of the world in criticizing the U.S. for the presence of non-independent 
territories under its control. As was the case regarding the colonies of 
European nations, the Soviet position was stated both in ideological terms (that 
is, colonialism as an expression of the capitalist system), and also as a product 
of racist attitudes as applied to the ethnically different groups ruled by European 
and U.S. colonial authorities. 21 Besides adopting this position at the United 
Nations, the Soviet Union also engaged in more active ways to undermine 
colonial rule. For example, the Soviets supplied weapons and equipment to the 
Chinese Communist movement, engaged until 1949 in a bloody civil war to take 
over China from the pro-U.S. Nationalist government. Once victorious, the 
Communist leadership of China passed on much of this material to Vietnamese 
insurgents in Indochina. Also, the program of indoctrination, propaganda and 
the granting of scholarships to students from "colonial" parts of the world 
(discontinued by Stalin during World War Two) was reactivated and expanded, 
to include more activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 22 However in the 
1940's, little meaningful support to revolutionary movements in those lands 
could be given, due to the more pressing demands on Soviet economic and 
military resources of the Cold War and the need to repair the extensive war 
damage caused by the German invasion. 
Regarding the nations of Latin America, the cultural and ethnic region of the 
Western Hemisphere to which Puerto Rico belongs, the position of the 
individual republics varied. At the United Nations and on other international 
stages, the position almost unanimously adopted was that the state of Puerto 
21 This standard Soviet position regarding colonialism remained essentially the same 
throughout the cold War period, and was reflected in many UN resolutions. One example is 
United Nations General Assembly, Document A/P.V. 106, November 1, 1947, that proposed 
stronger UN involvement in the administration of colonial territories. 
22 Herz, Beginning of the Cold War, 43-45. 
Rico was a purely internal affair of the United States, and that they would 
support any course taken by the people of Puerto Rico and approved by the 
United States. 23 Only Mexico and Argentina periodically broke ranks with the 
rest of Latin America to demand that Puerto Rico be granted sovereignty and 
independence. 24 
22 
23 Again, there are many examples of this voting record of the Latin American countries at the 
United Nations: defeat of UN General Assembly Resolution A/P. V. 106, (previously cited) is one 
example. 
24 This was caused by the traditional distrust of U.S. intentions and policies toward Latin 
America expressed by Mexico. and by U.S. opposition to then President Juan D. Per6n of 
Argentina. See Benjamin Keen and Mark Wesserman. A History of Latin America. (Boston: 
Houghton Miffin, 1988), 527-536. 
CHAPTER Ill 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING IN PUERTO RICO 
1898-1938 
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The events of 1938 mark a turning point in Puerto Rico's political history. In 
that year, Lufs Munoz Marfn, the chief architect of the Commonwealth formula, 
first organized a political party that captured the imagination of the Puerto Rican 
people. The growing popularity of Munoz Marfn's party provided the domestic 
and international base of support that made Commonwealth an acceptable 
solution in 1950. His achievement stands in marked contrast to the preceding 
40 years of U.S. colonial administration when U.S. policies, actions and 
attitudes generated considerable discontent among the people of Puerto Rico. 
The first few years of U.S. rule can be characterized as a period of 
adjustment for Puerto Ricans to the new political, social, economic and cultural 
realities now in place in the island. Foremost on the minds of the local political 
leadership was the debate on what shape the relationship between Puerto Rico 
and the the United States should take. Political parties were formed based 
upon the three general tendencies developed during the Spanish rule: closer 
ties to the colonial power (then as an overseas province of Spain and now as a 
potential state of the Union), outright sovereignty as an independent republic; or 
some type of autonomy as an intermediate step between the first two options. 
Those who favored autonomy, however, were in the unique position to be 
able to support their ideas with experience. The autonomists had at one point 
achieved their goal. Their leader was a prominent writer and journalist who 
arguably was the most experienced and highly regarded political figure in the 
island at the time. Through his efforts his party had managed to negotiate the 
granting by Spain in 1897 of a Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter), 
guaranteeing a measure of limited self-government to Puerto Rico. His name 
was Lufs Munoz Rivera, father of Lufs Munoz Marf n. 
Lufs Munoz Rivera was born in the small town of Barranquitas on 
November 6, 1859, to a moderately affluent family. His father, who owned a 
general store, wanted him to eventually take over the business but Munoz 
Rivera preferred to pursue a career in poetry and journalism. His political 
activities began in earnest in 1887 when he joined the newly created Partido 
Autonomista (Autonomist Party) whose leader, Ram6n Baldorioty de Castro, 
advocated the creation of a type of self-government loosely based on that of 
Canada's. 1 
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Support for such an arrangement was widespread among liberal 
intellectuals and the criollo (native Puerto Ricans, as opposed to the 
peninsulares or those born in Spain) professional and small landowner 
classes. Conservative peninsulares, fearful of loosing their power and 
influence to the criollos, accused the autonomists of secretly planning the 
independence of the island. They succeeded in convincing the newly arrived 
governor of the island, General Romualdo Palacio Gonzalez, that an anti-
Spanish uprising was about to be launched by the members of the Partido 
Autonomista. General Palacio initiated a series of repressive actions known as 
los compontes (and old term used in Cuba to describe forced confessions) that 
included the arrest and torture of those he considered to be enemies of the 
Spanish regime. The principal leaders of the autonomist movement were 
imprisoned in San Juan and threatened with execution. Many others were 
1 Morales Carrion, Puerto Rico, 116-117. 
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jailed throughout the countryside, including people with no political convictions 
accused as "revolutionaries" by personal enemies. 2 
During this period, Munoz Rivera was collaborating with other liberal 
leaders demanding the removal of the governor. Their continuous complaints 
finally convinced the Spanish government to recall General Palacio, who 
returned to Spain after only four months in office. However, the compontes had 
effectively destroyed the old organization of the autonomists, even with their 
principal leaders free again. 
Lufs Munoz Rivera launched La Democracia, a newspaper that became a 
platform for his political activities. In 1891 he began publishing a series of 
articles in favor of forming an alliance or pact with any of the democratic parties 
in Spain willing to accept his doctrine in favor of autonomy for Puerto Rico.3 
Munoz Rivera personally preferred to deal with the Partido Liberal Fusionista 
(Liberal Fusionist Party) led by Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, who in the past had 
declared his support for reforms in the administration of the colonies. 
Between 1891 and 1895, Munoz Rivera matured as a political leader as he 
tried to win over the rank and file of the Partido Autonomista to his plan for a 
merger with the fusionistas in Spain. At the same time, he considered what type 
of autonomous government would be both politically acceptable to the people 
of the island and to Sagasta once his party attained power in Spain. By 1895 
Spain was facing armed rebellions in its principal overseas territories 
of Cuba and the Philippines. In Cuba, the revolt was launched by the poet and 
2 Lidia Cruz Monclova, Historia del afio1887. 3rd ed., (Rio Piec:lras, Puerto Rico, Editorial 
Universitaria U.P.R., 1970), 270-275. 
3 The Spanish electoral system at that time was based on an 1878 law that guaranteed the 
right to vote fro representatives to the national par1iament (the Cortes) to all tax-paying male 
citizens of at least 25 years of age in Spain and its overseas territories. See Figueroa, Breve 
historia. 1 :420. 
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writer Jose Martf, who is considered a national hero in his country. He was also 
concerned that the United States would interfere in the conflict and replace 
Spain as colonial master of Cuba. 4 This placed the Spanish government under 
great economic strain and heightened tensions with the United States, which 
openly supported the rebels. 5 Meanwhile in Puerto Rico the Partido 
Autonomista leadership appointed Munoz Rivera as leader of a commission 
entrusted to go to Spain and begin talks with national parties that might favor 
autonomy for the island. The commission arrived in Madrid on October 8, 1896, 
and began negotiations that eventually led to an agreement with Sagasta and 
the Partido Liberal Fusionista. 
An unexpected series of events rewarded the foresight of the Puerto Rican 
autonomist leadership. In October of 1897 Praxedes Mateo Sagasta was 
appointed Prime Minister by Queen Maria Cristina, and without delay set out to 
fulfill his promise to Munoz Rivera. The Carta Auton6mica (Autonomic Charter) 
of 1897 gave Puerto Rico full representation in the Cortes, the Spanish 
Parliament, and extensive rights to make commercial treaties and to control 
trade and tariffs. The island was to continue to by ruled by a governor 
appointed from Spain, but a new legislature consisting of a Chamber of 
Deputies and an Administrative Council was to have control over internal 
affairs. The first elections for the legislature were held on March 27, 1898, and 
the autonomists captured a majority of the seats. 6 Luis Munoz Rivera became 
the highest ranking Puerto Rican in the government, but the start of the 
Spanish-American War on April 25, 1898 cut short the experience of self-
4 See Jose Martf, Obras completas, (Havana, Cuba: Editorial Lex, 1946). 
5 Alden March, The History and Conquest of the Philippines and Our Other Island 
Possessions, (Chicago: Audubon Publishing Co., 1899), 134-154. 
e Figueroa, Breve historia. 2:127-144. 
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government for the island. 
The United States declared war on Spain after the warship Maine was 
sunk by an explosion in Havana, Cuba. The U.S. blamed the attack on the 
Spanish authorities and war was declared on April 26, 1898. After a short 
campaign, the U.S. military defeated the land and naval forces of Spain and by 
the terms of the Treaty of Paris1 Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States, 
together with the Philippines and Guam. 
The first government of the island was a military regime under General 
Nelson A. Miles. Gen. Miles had led the campaign for the conquest of Puerto 
Rico, and lasted in office until 1900. In that year Congress approved the Foraker 
Act' that replaced the military government with a civilian one. 
The government of Puerto Rico under the short-lived (1900-1917) Foraker 
Act consisted of a governor appointed by the President of the United States, a 
bicameral legislature formed by an Executive Council (appointed also by the 
President) and a House of Delegates elected by the people. Also there would 
be an elected Resident Commissioner as representative of the people of Puerto 
Rico before Congress; he could speak, but had no vote. The laws passed by the 
House of Delegates were subject to the Governor's and Congressional vetoes. 
Lu, s Munoz Rivera was elected Resident Commissioner in 1910, and went 
to Washington with the same agenda for greater self-government powers for the 
island that he had taken to Madrid fourteen years earlier in 1896. His family, 
including young Lurs, born in 1898, accompanied him. By 1915 Munoz Rivera 
had succeeded in convincing a number of Congressmen and the administration 
7 Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, signed at the City of Paris, on 
December 10, 1898. art. II, VIII. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899). 
8 Named after Senator Joseph B. Foraker from Ohio. For further information see Morales 
Carri6n, Puerto Rico. 156-159. 
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of President Woodrow Wilson about the need for reform in the island. He 
continued to point out that the Foraker Act did not provide for U.S. citizenship or 
voting representation in Congress, in contrast to the Carta Auton6mica. Also 
the Carta authorized greater powers to regulate commerce and taxation. 
However, no concrete action was taken by Congress and at the end of the 
session Munoz Rivera, in failing health, returned to Puerto Rico. 
Again, international political and military events made possible further 
political changes in the island. The entry of the United States into World War I 
(1914-1918) on the side of Britain and France was imminent, and President 
Wilson was concerned that Germany might foment anti-U.S. unrest in Latin 
America. 0 Under these conditions Congress finally approved the Jones Act10 on 
February 20, 1917. The war on Germany was declared just a few weeks later. 
The Jones Act created a new, and fully elective bicameral legislature for 
Puerto Rico. It would have an upper house, the Senado (Senate) with nineteen 
members, and a lower house, the Camara de Representantes (House of 
Representatives) with thirty-nine members. All males twenty one years or older 
were allowed to vote. The governor, who has veto power over all acts passed 
by the legislature, continued to be appointed by the President of the United 
States, as were (among others) the Attorney General and the Auditor. The 
Commissioner of Education was also appointed by the President. This is 
consistent with the policy set in Washington that the mission of the public 
education system should be to make the future generations of Puerto Rico into 
9 The President had learned of a German offer to Mexico (the Zimmennan note) to form an 
alliance against the United States. Mexico would have received Arizona, Texas and New Mexico at 
the end of the war. See Marshall Dill Jr., Gennanv, A Modem History. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1970), 226. 
'° For the complete text of the Jones Act, see Albert P. Blauestein and Eric B. Blauestein, 
eds., Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties. ·commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico", (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1977) 
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better U.S. citizens. Great emphasis was placed on the displacement of 
Spanish by English as the language of instruction in schools. 11 Another 
provision was the granting of U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico 
(incidentally, making them eligible for conscription into military service during 
the coming war). There were no changes in economic, judicial or military 
relationship between the island and the U.S. as defined by the Foraker Act. All 
laws passed by the Puerto Rican legislature had to be sent to the President for 
review at the end of the legislative session. Congress could also review and 
overturn any laws approved in Puerto Rico. Defense, interstate and 
international trade, control of coastal waters and navigable rivers, among other 
matters, remained under the direct control of the Federal government. The 
retention of such powers indicated the intention of the U.S. to intervene in the 
island's politics should U.S. authorities see the need. 
Luis Munoz Rivera died in San Juan on November 15, 1916 without having 
any knowledge of the passage of the Jones Act. To the last he maintained that 
the struggle for a better Puerto Rico laid in the attainment of self-government 
and good relations with the United States. 12 The Jones Act would remain 
essentially unchanged as the organic law of the island until 1949. 
Changes in the economic development of Puerto Rico during this period 
were as profound as those in the political arena. The most important change 
took place in agriculture when sugar increasingly became the principal crop 
replacing coffee, which had been the main export during Spanish rule. Before 
1898 close to forty percent of the cultivated land was dedicated to coffee 
production, as the Puerto Rican variety was very popular in Europe. However, 
11 For more information see Aida Negron de Montilla, La americanizaci6n en Puerto Rico y el 
sistema de educaci6n publica: 1900-1930. (Rfo Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial U.P.R., 1976). 
12 Morales Carri6n, Puerto Rico. 196. 
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the European markets had high tariffs on U.S. products, that were now applied 
to Puerto Rico, and in the United States the cheaper, less flavorful Brazilian 
coffee was preferred. 13 In 1899 hurricane San Ciriaco hit the island taking a 
heavy toll of life and property and also caused great damage to the coffee 
plantations. 
Probably the most important factor in explaining the ascent of sugar was 
the investment in mills and land from U.S. corporations, as it could enter the 
mainland markets duty-free. Sugar quickly became the most important sector of 
the economy. Production increased from 66,073 tons in 1895 to 866,109 tons in 
1930, while at the same time, coffee production declined from 39,683,160 lbs. to 
1,278,266 lbs. 14 
This change from coffee to sugar led to the decline of the small holdings in 
agriculture, as the sugar industry became increasingly dominated by 
technologically advanced operations and large landowners. The plight of the 
small farmer and the agricultural worker, the Hbaro. would become a central 
aspect of the political climate of the 1930's. 
Although both the Foraker and the Jones Acts provided for a series of 
specific reforms in public services and agriculture. not enough was done to 
solve the many problems facing the people of Puerto Rico. Since the early 
1900"s, the political parties of the island were centered on the one vital issue 
that clouded any discussion on the future of Puerto Rico: the status question. 
The merits of either statehood or independence as a solution to the many ills of 
the country were ceaselessly debated, but little concrete action was taken to 
'
3 James L. Dietz, Economic History of Puerto Rico. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 99-103. 
'
41bid., 102-105. 
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address the immediate economic and social issues as common sense would 
seem to dictate. 
This was the political climate to which Lufs Munoz Marfn returned home. 
The young Munoz had spent most of his formative years living in the United 
States, attending Georgetown University and serving as assistant to his father 
while Munoz Rivera was Resident Commissioner in Washington. After his 
father's death, Munoz Marfn had stayed in the U.S., living in New York and 
writing for several newspapers and magazines. However, he continued to follow 
the political developments back in Puerto Rico. 
On his visit to the island in 1920 Munoz Marfn first became directly 
involved in the local political process. During his years in the U.S. he had 
become influenced by Fabian socialism and was initially drawn to the Partido 
Socialista (Socialist Party) founded by labor organizer Santiago Iglesias Pantfn. 
Born in Spain, Iglesias Pantrn began to organize workers in his native country, 
and Cuba, before coming to Puerto Rico in 1896. After the U.S. conquest of the 
island, he formed links with the American Federation of Labor (A.F.l.), and 
founded the Partido Socialista in 1915. The platform of the party rested on the 
principle that the plight of the workers would be alleviated if the labor laws of the 
U.S. were implemented by the island. Such implementation would be 
facilitated by statehood. However, Munoz Marfn could neither support 
statehood nor abandon his father's idea of autonomy, with eventual 
independence. He once again departed for the U.S. to continue his literary 
career. 15 
While the Partido Socialista and the Partido Republicano (founded in 1900 
15 Carmelo Rosario Nadal, Lufs Munoz Marfn y la independencia de Puerto Rico (1907-1946}, 
(San Juan. Puerto Rico, First Book Publishing, 1994), 42. 
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by Rosendo Matienzo Cintr6n and Jose Barbosa with an agenda of complete 
assimilation of Puerto Rico to U.S. culture, economy and political system) 
supported statehood, the Partido Unionista envisioned independence as the 
ultimate goal. As one of the major parties of the island, the Partido Unionista 
had won the legislative elections of 1917 and 1920 but had downplayed its 
demands for independence in favor of first modifying the colonial government. 
The Unionista Resident Commissioner in Washington, Felix Cordova Davila, 
promoted the idea in Congress of an elective governor. In general, the pro-
independence forces were committed to work within the established political 
system, as they were confident that the U.S. would eventually concede 
independence to the island if a majority of the people requested so. The 
radicalization of the pro- independence movement and the rise of Pedro Albizu 
Campos and the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), came as a direct 
consequence of the actions of the new governor appointed by the 
administration of President Harding. 16 
Emmet Montgomery Reilly became governor in 1921, having little or no 
experience in public administration and knowing next to nothing about Puerto 
Rico. 11 In his inaugural speech he made it clear that those who demanded 
independence (i.e., the Unionistas) were "anti-American", that English and 
"American" culture should eventually supplant Spanish and the local culture, 
and reiterated that as long as the United States existed, Puerto Rico would 
never be independent. 18 Governor Reilly's ideological mixture of extreme 
conservativism, superpatriotism, fundamentalist Protestantism, and disdain for 
16 Negron de Montilla, La americanizaci6n. 212-213. 
17 Emmet M. Reilly was a mortgage broker from Kansas City, and his appointment was basically 
a reward for his support and friendship with President Harding. 
18 Negron de Montilla, La americanizaci6n. 192-198. 
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the people of Puerto Rico aroused strong opposition not only among the 
Unionistas but also the Socialistas and many other sectors of society. 
Eventually Reilly was recalled to Washington in 1922 at the request of the 
Unionista-dominated legislature. The recall occurred after a barrage of articles, 
editorials and letters (including some from Luis Munoz Marin, writing from New 
York) protesting his actions. But now the Unionistas were determined to alter 
their position on the question of the status to avoid future charges of "anti-
Americanism." Their new platform referred only to obtaining a greater degree of 
self-government. This led those who still favored independence to 
split away from the party and form a new organization, the Partido Nacionalista 
de Puerto Rico on September 17, 1922. 
The first political parties formed under U.S. rule to advocate independence 
were led by old leaders such as Jose de Diego, who had led the same struggle 
against the old Spanish regime. However, in 1919 several new organizations, 
such as the Juventud Nacionalista (or Nationalist Youth), founded by university 
students, and the Asociaci6n Nacionalista (or Nationalist Association), founded 
by professionals and intellectuals, also advocated independence. These 
groups were formed as resistance movements against forced Americanization. 
For example, the leader of the Partido Nacionalista, Pedro Albizu Campos 19 , 
equated independence with a rejection of "American" culture and influence and 
a return to the Spanish traditions of the past. He also believed that it was 
unlikely that the U.S. would grant the island independence in the future. Albizu 
19 Pedro Albizu Campos (1891-1965) was born in Ponce. He attended Harvard University and 
obtained a law degree in 1917. He also served as an officer in the Puerto Rican regiment raised by 
the U.S. Army during World War I. Disillusioned with the Partido Unionista, he became a founding 
member of the Partido Nacionalista and latter its leader in 1930. For more information see Cesareo 
Rosa-Nieves and Esther M. Melon, Colecciones Puertorriquef'las, "Bioqraffas puertorrigueflas: 
perfil hist6rico de un pueblo". (Sharon, Connecticut, Troutman Press, 1979), 15-17 
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Campos was convinced of the need for an armed uprising to free the country. 
Numerous acts of violence and murder took place starting in 1932 as the 
Nacionalistas battled against their political enemies and the police. 20 This led to 
an intense polarization of society, driven by the heavy-handed actions of the 
police and U.S. authorities. 
On the other hand, the traditional parties that controlled the legislative 
branch of the island's limited self-governing system were in disarray. The 
Partido Unionista, weakened by its internal ideological differences, had 
disappeared. The old Unionista leadership had reformed under the name of 
Partido Liberal (Liberal party), but it no longer was a major party. The 
Republicanos and the Socialistas, both supporters of statehood for the island, 
had agreed on an united front for the elections of 1932. This common goal, plus 
the fact that these parties were closely allied to the big industrial and sugar 
interests, made their joint Coalici6n (Coalition) a favorite with the U.S. 
authorities in Puerto Rico. 21 
Lufs Munoz Marin made his definitive return to the island in 1931. He was 
determined to remain involved in the political process of the island, and joined 
the newly-formed Partido Liberal. The Liberales at this time struggled to 
reorganize and reach a consensus regarding the status question. Ideologically 
the party clearly agreed on opposing the continued dominance of the island's 
economy by large U.S.-based corporations and dissatisfaction with the current 
administrative arrangements. But a wide variety of proposed solutions 
fragmented the party. There were strong pro-statehood and pro-autonomy 
20 Mini Seij6 Bruno, La insurrecci6n nacionalista en Puerto Rico-1950, (Rfo Piedras, Puerto 
Rico, Editorial Edil, 1989), 13-18. 
21 Jose M. Tous Rodriguez, Desarrollo hist6rico-polftico y juridico del Estado Libre Asociado 
de Puerto Rico. (San Juan, Puerto Rico: By the author, Banco de Ponce Building, 1977), 130-
136. 
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factions while the leadership traditionally favored independence. Munoz Marfn 
quickly became identified with the pro-independence group, and was selected 
to run as candidate for the Senado in the coming elections. 
The elections of 1932 came at a time of great economic distress in Puerto 
Rico. Conditions on the island took a turn for the worse with the onset of the 
Great Depression in 1929, aggravated in September of 1932 by the effects of 
hurricane San Ciprian (that almost completely destroyed what remained of the 
coffee and tobacco industries, and heavily damaged the sugar crop). There 
were a number of strikes among the sugar cane workers demanding better 
conditions and higher wages. As the corporations refused to negotiate, the 
workers became more receptive to the Partido Nacionalista. 
The Coalici6n of Republicanos and Socialistas won the elections of 1932, 
although the Liberates became the strongest single party and Munoz Marfn was 
elected as senator-at-large. He later was appointed as representative of the 
Partido Liberal in Washington, where he promptly became acquainted with 
many influential figures of the new Democratic administration of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt . 
The increasingly vociferous Nacionalistas blamed the deepening of the 
economic crisis on the colonial subjugation of the island by the United States. 
On October 24, 1935 a group of Nacionalistas clashed with the police outside 
the campus of University of Puerto Rico in Rf o Piedras. Three Nacionalistas 
were killed and one policeman wounded. At the funeral, Albizu Campos stated 
that their deaths would be avenged, and declared war on the chief of police, 
Colonel Francis E. Riggs. On February 23, 1936, two Nacionalistas shot and 
killed Col. Riggs but were captured shortly after. Then, while under police 
custody, both men were executed. 
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These events caused great concern in the U.S. government. The 
authorities were determined to arrest Albizu Campos and crush the 
Nacionalista movement. In Puerto Rico there was general disapproval of the 
killing of Col. Riggs, but also of the actions of the police. Albizu Campos and 
the top leadership of the Partido Nacionalista were arrested, convicted of 
conspiring to overthrow the U.S. authority in the island, and sent to a Federal 
penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. The rank-and-file Nacionalistas were now 
more than ever determined to continue their struggle. To prove that even 
without their leaders they remained a visible force, the party organized a march 
on Albizu Campos' hometown of Ponce on March 21, 1937. After first 
approving of the march, the U.S. authorities reversed themselves and ordered 
the police to disperse the marchers. The police then fired into the crowd killing 
twenty-one people. 22 
The upheaval caused by the political violence between the Nacionalistas 
and the colonial government did not go unnoticed in Washington. Senator 
Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, a close friend of the slain police chief Riggs, 
introduced a bill on April of 1936 to grant independence to Puerto Rico but with 
punitive conditions. The Tydings Bill allowed for a referendum on whether or 
not the people of Puerto Rico wanted independence. If the answer was yes, 
then a constitutional convention will draw a constitution that would need to be 
approved by the President of the United States and then voted on by the 
people. After a four year transition period, the island would be independent. 
However, once Puerto Ricans voted in favor of independence, all Federal 
welfare and economic assistance programs will cease. The provisional 
22 This incident became known in Puerto Rico as "la Masacre de Ponce" or Ponce's Massacre. 
For an eyewitness account, see Rafael V. Perez Marchand, Reminiscencia hist6rica de la Masacre 
de Ponce, (San Lorenzo, Puerto Rico, Partido Nacionalista, 1972). 
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government of Puerto Rico was expected to assume all costs for the 
administration, defense and welfare of the people of the island. On top of this, 
Puerto Rico would be faced with full tariffs on its exports to the U.S. at the end of 
the four year transition period. The introduction of this bill sparked widespread 
debate in the island about the status situation and forced the major political 
leaders to take a stand on the issue of independence. 23 
The Partido Liberal was faced with a growing rift between the old leader, 
Antonio Barcelo, and Munoz Marfn. Barcelo wanted to seize the opportunity 
and support the Tydings Bill despite the economic hardship that would befall the 
island if independence was achieved under those terms. Munoz Marin, 
however, considered that such a choice would impoverish Puerto Rico even 
more, particularly the already poor. Also, he considered that in the upcoming 
elections the Partido Liberal and the whole ideal of independence will now be 
associated with the Tydings Bill: 
The moment the Tydings Bill was presented the election were lost...They 
were lost because it compels the sugar industry to spend all the money that 
may be necessary to defeat the only party (the Nationalists don't count) that 
stands for independence in Puerto Rico in an unequivocally [sic] way. The 
Tydings Bill has created, through its unfair picture of economic ruin, a terror in 
the minds of thousands of persons of the middle class and of the working 
class. This picture can be wiped out by the reality, but not in four months ... But 
have to save our people from falling into the worst possible reaction for many 
years to come. 24 
The Liberales lost to the Coalici6n in the 1936 elections by a wide margin, 
a defeat blamed by the leadership on the official pro-independence stance of 
the party. They eventually decided to drop their support for independence, and 
expel those who refused to accept the new party line. Munoz Marin could not 
conceive abandoning the ideal of independence, and broke away from the 
23 Rosario Nadal, Luis Munoz Marin y la independencia, 82-84. 
2
• Excerpt from a letter from Munoz Marin to journalist Ruby Black, July 15, 1936. Ibid., 90. 
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Partido Liberal. 
On July 22, 1938, Lufs Munoz Marin founded the Partido Popular 
Democratico (Popular Democratic Party), or PPD. Independence remained the 
ultimate goal for Munoz Marfn, but the party would concentrate first on resolving 
the many colonial problems of Puerto Rico. He set out to address the terrible 
situation of the jfbaro. the rural peasant, and make this the centerpiece of the his 
party's work. Munoz Marin realized that only the Federal government could 
provide the technical and financial support needed to implement his plan, and 
was encouraged by the progress of the New Deal programs created by the 
administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The PPD program 
envisioned land reform and the enforcement of the laws banning the ownership 
by corporations of more than five-hundred acres of lands (many individual 
sugar companies owned in fact thousands of acres of prime cultivable land). 
The equalization of income by means of progressive tax reform, increased 
minimum wages and increased public assistance programs for the elderly and 
disabled were other proposed measures. Lastly, the party proposed the 
expansion of the economy as a whole by means of increased investment and 
diversification in industry and agriculture. 
In more than one respect, the activities of Munoz Marin during this time 
mirror those of his father Luis Munoz Rivera fifty years earlier. Both father and 
son were convinced that autonomy was the best alternative for improving the 
economic and social condition of the island in the short run while leaving the 
door open for future moves towards independence. Also, both men were 
committed to finding a political middle ground that could equally accommodate 
the aspirations for reform of the people of Puerto Rico and the concerns and 
interests of the colonial ruler. This was reflected in their opposition to violence 
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or revolution as an instrument of political struggle. 
Another similarity was that for both Spain and the U.S. events in the 
international arena focused attention on the political situation of Puerto Rico. 
While in the early 1940's the United States was concerned with the possibility 
expansion of German (and, after 1945, Soviet) power into the Caribbean and 
Latin America as a result of social and nationalist upheavals, in the 1890's 
Spain was equally alarmed with the prospects of U.S. intervention in favor of 
Cuban and Puerto Rican pro-independence movements. 
The PPD and Munoz Marfn campaigned feverishly during the months 
leading to the election of 1940. They chose the pava. the typical straw hat of the 
peasant, as their symbol and the words "Pan, Tierra, Libertad" ("Bread, Land 
and Liberty") as their slogan. The party was counting on mostly poor rural 
people as their base of support, and nobody was sure if they would vote. 
A common practice at the time was for local party bosses to give one or two 
dollars (a day's wages for many workers) to the peasants in exchange for their 
support. Munoz Marfn countered that he was only asking them to "loan" their 
votes to the PPD, and if he did not deliver on what was promised, they could 
turn his party out of office on the next election. 25 
Although the Populares came out of the election as the largest single party, 
they did not win a clear victory. However they did have enough seats in the 
legislature to began setting into motion their ambitious reform package. During 
World War 11 and its aftermath, however, the pace and scope of the internal 
sociopolitical development of the island would be affected by events in the 
international arena which were beyond the control of the Puerto Rican people. 
25 Eugenio Fernandez Mendez, Colecciones Puertorriguenas, "Historia ilustrada de un 
pueblo", (Sharon, Connecticut, Troutman Press, 1979), 215. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS QUESTION 
By late 1940, Nazi Germany's war of conquest had led to the occupation of 
most of Western Europe. The fate of the Caribbean colonies of France, the 
Netherlands and Britain, countries either already conquered or at the brink of 
collapse, suddenly brought to the forefront of U.S. military planners the strategic 
importance of Puerto Rico. 
Since early 1939 a series of strategic defense plans for the Western 
Hemisphere, code-named "Rainbow", were prepared to meet a concerted attack 
form the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan). The formulation and adoption 
of a hemispheric defense policy was part of the main mission of the United 
States armed forces, which was the defense of the U.S. mainland against a 
military threat. Key to the overall military posture was the defense of the 
Panama Canal, 1 vital route of communication between the Atlantic and the 
Pacific. Since it was determined that the Canal could only be attacked from a 
base in the Western Hemisphere, the main thrust of the defense strategy was to 
prevent the establishment of an enemy base in Central or South America within 
range of the Panama Canal. As part of this objective, the U.S. Army concluded 
that an air base in Puerto Rico was vital to the defense of the eastern 
approaches to the Caribbean. 
The military forces initially available in 1939 consisted only of a Navy radio 
station in San Juan, and the Army's 65th Infantry Regiment, a Puerto Rican 
1 Carmen Gautier Mayoral, et al. ed., Puerto Rico en las relaciones internacionales def Caribe 
(Rfo Piedras, Puerto Rico, Ediciones Huracan, 1990), 162 
regular unit. Immediately a new airfield (Ramey Field) was constructed in 
Aguadilla, and plans for Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Ceiba completed. 
Rear Admiral 8. H. Bieri described Puerto Rico's strategic importance to the 
Navy as follows: 
(a) Its central and forward position in relation to the Panama Canal and the 
east coast of the United States. 
(b) Its commanding position over all the approaches to the Caribbean. 
(c) It is the only outpost among the islands of the Caribbean, with the 
exception of the western part of Haiti and Trinidad, that could be 
developed into a main naval base. 
(d) If we are unable to use this base, the Unites States Fleet will need to 
anchor in Panama or at Chesapeake Bay.2 
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The deterioration in the European situation prompted a review of the 
"Rainbow" planning. The new plan, "Rainbow 4", pointed out the need for 
additional bases in Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular; 
the occupation of the European colonies in the Caribbean and military 
assistance to the states of the region. Greater military cooperation with Britain 
was later added. The military policy of the U.S. regarding Latin America 
continued under these guidelines throughout the war. 
In the fall of 1940, President Roosevelt sent an investigation commission 
into the Caribbean. The Commission included Rexford G. Tugwell, a 
controversial member of the advisory committee that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt created to manage the the social and economic programs of the New 
Deal. He held a number of positions in the Roosevelt administration and, from 
1941 to 1946, served as governor of Puerto Rico. 3 The Commission concluded 
2 Memoranda from Rear Admiral B.H. Bieri, "Assistant Plan Officer, U.S. Fleet, Headquarters of 
the Commander in Chief, Navy Dept., Washington D.C." to General A.C. Wademeyer. Quoted in 
Gautier Mayoral, Puerto Rico en las relaciones, 163. 
3 For more information on Tugwell's career before this appointment, see John F. Carter, The 
New Dealers, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1934) 
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that drastic social reforms were needed, together with military measures, in 
order to secure the area. Tugwell criticized not only the colonial administrations 
of Britain and France, but also the indifferent and ineffective rule of Puerto Rico 
by the U.S. colonial authorities. 4 
U.S. involvement in the Caribbean increased in September of 1940 after 
the Lend-Lease agreement with Britain, which involved the transfer of fifty 
destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for the right to build bases on British 
colonial territories. Air and naval facilities were built in Jamaica, Bahamas, 
Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guyana. These bases secured all 
entrances to the Caribbean, with the installations at Chaguaramas in Trinidad 
considered the most important due to their proximity to the vital bauxite and oil 
resources from northern South America and the Dutch islands of Aruba and 
Cura~ao. 
On September 19, 1941 President Roosevelt appointed Rexford G. Tugwell 
as governor of Puerto Rico. Tugwell had earlier expressed to President 
Roosevelt his concerns at the social situation of the Caribbean, and in particular 
of the U.S. treatment of Puerto Rico. Socioeconomic reform became the 
common thread that bound together Tugwell and Munoz Marin. They both 
sought to remove the injustices of the past colonial administrations. Altruism 
aside, correcting economic exploitation was of utmost importance in securing 
Puerto Rico as a part of the U.S. war effort. Tugwell fit well the need for 
someone who could add administrative experience to strategic concern. 
When Tugwell became governor, Munoz Marin had already begun enacting his 
campaign agenda. Most important was the creation of an Autoridad de Tierras 
(Land Authority) empowered to purchase lands held in excess of the 500-acre 
• Rexford G. Tugwell, The Stricken Land. (New York, Greenwood Press, 1946), 64-79. 
) 
. 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
j 
I j 
l• 
' 
43 
limitation. Farm wages would include proportionate shares of the profit, and 
land would be redistributed to peasant families. Also, the PPD set in motion the 
basis for a reformed civil service, and the increased role of the government in 
the economic and social development of the island. The sudden rush of public 
initiative and power created deep resentment among the conservative elements 
of society. The Coalici6n, despite their power, could not stop the legislation. 
Their leadership maintained that the new legislation was both leftist and rightist, 
and that the governor was supporting the PPD in an effort to build a personal 
dictatorship.5 Tugwell's anti-New Deal enemies in the United States joined the 
chorus, and in 1943, congressional committees sent subcommittees to the 
island to find out was was happening. 
In February, 1943, Tugwell stated his case before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs, headed by Senator Dennis 
Chaves of New Mexico.6 If his support of the Puerto Rican urge for 
reconstruction indicated "an imperfect understanding of a colonial governor's 
duties," Congress had also been at fault; for the Jones Act assigned duties "in 
controlling this possession to others than the governor." This act, he held, had 
the inherent quality of all older approaches to colonialism in that the home 
government reserves the right to prescribe what a people cannot do, because if 
they were free, they would do something unwise. 1 Since the act had been in 
force for twenty-six years, why had the United States failed to move decisively in 
reviewing the demands for political reform coming from the island? "Two million 
5 Charles T. Goodsell, Administration of a Revolution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 24-25. 
6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories and Insular affairs, Subcommittee Report 
on Economic and Social Conditions in Puerto Rico (Report No. 628, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943). 
1 Ibid., 10-12. 
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people" he stated "cannot permanently be kept in the twilight colonialism. "9 
According to Tugwell, the infighting, divisionism and increasing 
radicalization of the political process in Puerto Rico could be traced back to the 
U.S. Congress' unwillingness to provide a clear policy regarding the future of 
the island. The U.S. was neither preparing the island for statehood or 
independence, nor proposing to modify the Jones Act in order to grant more 
autonomy in order that the people of Puerto Rico could effectively work to 
improve their own situation. The legislature of Puerto Rico, in his opinion, was 
under the tutelage of Congress, and Congress had to decide whether to move 
towards independence or to grant greater autonomy. In either case, the United 
States was responsible for creating conditions for its success. He advocated an 
immediate modification of the Jones Act to provide for an elective governor, as 
this would reduce the power of the political parties and provide leadership to 
the legislature. 0 
The likelihood of political reforms had to be taken in the context of the 
current war situation. Since the Japanese attack on the military installations at 
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in late 1941 , the Axis armed forces had inflicted heavy 
losses on the U.S. The Japanese now occupied the U.S. Pacific territories of 
the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and they were threatening Alaska with 
invasion. At the same time German U-Boats were inflicting heavy losses on 
merchant vessels plying the sea lanes of the Caribbean and the Mid-Atlantic. 
With the island effectively under blockade from the German submarines, 10 and 
the U.S. military buildup in Puerto Rico barely getting under way, there was 
a Morales Carri6n, Puerto Rico. 252. 
9 Tugwell, The Stricken Land. 540-541. 
10 By September 1942 arriving cargo tonnage was just 7 percent of the usual monthly rate. 
The total cargo tonnage delivered to the island in 1942 was less than two thirds of what was 
delivered in 1940. See Goodsell, Administration of a Revolution. 21. 
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the distinct possibility that internal unrest might erupt. 
Governor Tugwell was most concerned with the activities of the large and 
influential Spanish community in the island. There were an estimated six 
thousand Spanish citizens, many of them residents of Puerto Rico at the time of 
the Spanish-American War of 1898 who refused to accept U.S. citizenship in 
1917 when the Jones Act came into effect. This community had many interests 
in business and commerce, and in general supported the Fascist regime of 
General Franco in Spain. 11 
While officially neutral, the Franco regime, which controlled Spain since 
1939 after defeating the democratically-elected Spanish Republican 
government in the Civil War, actively assisted the Axis powers. Franco had sent 
troops (mostly members of the Falange, the Spanish Fascist party) to participate 
in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and also provided bases for the U-
Boats. Of more immediate concern were the activities of the overseas branch of 
the Falange, as the Germans were allowed to use this network of Franco 
sympathizers to gather intelligence throughout Latin America. 12 
In Puerto Rico the local Falange branch was under surveillance by the 
authorities, and in 1941 the members accepted outwardly the dissolution of the 
organization. However, the Falangistas remained committed to the return of the 
island to Spain as a prelude of the rebirth of the Spanish Empire in the 
Americas. This, combined with their strong rejection of the imposition of U.S. 
social, political and cultural values on people of Spanish stock, such as Puerto 
Ricans, raised the possibility that elements of the banished Nacionalista 
movement might be attracted to the Falange agenda. The U.S. could hardly 
11 Tugwell, The Stricken Land, 161-162. 
12 Allan Chase, Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the Americas, (New York, G.P Putnam's 
Sons, 1943), 125-150. 
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afford the disruption to their operation in the Caribbean that would occur if, due 
to combination of economic hardship and lack of political freedoms, the people 
of Puerto Rico would join a German-supported Nacionalista revolt. 
Both Tugwell and Munoz Marfn realized that the war-time scarcity and 
isolation would make it even more difficult to find solutions to the problems of 
the island. They outlined the measures that needed to be taken in Puerto Rico. 
They insisted on the need for agricultural improvement, for industrialization, and 
for a policy to supersede the old colonialism. An elective governor was a 
beginning, as had been suggested by the appointed Tugwell. The long period 
of inaction in Congress should come to an end, and the Puerto Rican electorate 
must be allowed to express itself. 13 
The war generated problems, but also opportunities. The drive for reform 
and reconstruction created a new sense of purpose and reduced the clashes 
between the executive and the legislative branches. Federal expenditures 
helped the economy. Income directly traceable to war activities of the federal 
government rose from $8. 1 million in 1940 to $106.4 million in 1944. 14 The rum 
and tobacco industries also benefited from the absence of competition from 
Europe. In particular, the U.S. liquor market proved to be a bonanza for Puerto 
Rican rum producers. In five years, their net income rose from $1.6 million to 
$14.3 million. Another improvement was the diversification of the economic 
base, as manufacturing was becoming relatively more important than in 
previous years. Finally, by late 1943 the German U-Boats were becoming less 
effective in disrupting the flow of shipping into the Caribbean, this due mostly to 
the increase in U.S. and Allied naval and air power in the region. 
13 Tugwell. The Stricken Land, 686. 
1
• Daniel Creamer. The Net Income of the Puerto Rican Economy, 1940-1944. (Rfo Piedras. 
Puerto Rico. n.d. ). 21-22. In Morales Carrion. Puerto Rico, 253. 
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By 1944 the military situation looked more favorable to the U.S. and the 
island's economy slowly but steadily improved. Munoz Marfn and the PPD 
looked forward to the coming elections. A convincing electoral victory would not 
only allow the Populares to accelerate their social and economic plans, but 
would also give them greater authority in their future attempts to seek greater 
autonomy. The PPD maintained that the status was not an issue for them in the 
elections, but had pledged to wait until after the end of the war to conduct a 
referendum. 
During the elections of 1944, the PPD obtained an extraordinary victory that 
included the absolute control of the legislature for the first time. 15 The Populares 
controlled all the seats in the Senado. and thirty four of the thirty five seats in the 
Camara de Representantes. The preponderance of the PPD established with 
this election would last until 1968. 16 
From 1943 to 1945, several projects were presented in Congress, at the 
urging of Governor Tugwell, to reform the political and administrative framework 
of the island. 11 One of these bills, S.952, proposed the independence of the 
island and was initially backed by the PPD. However, despite the realization 
that the status quo needed to be changed, concern over the fate of U.S. military 
installations weighted heavily against granting independence to Puerto Rico. At 
the hearings for this bill, the Assistant Secretary of War stated that from a 
military point of view "it would be easier if we had sovereignty over any area, to 
make our military dispositions over the area". 18 Senator Robert A. Taft expressed 
15 Bolivar Pagan, Historia de los partidos polfticos puertorriguenos: 1898-1956. (San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, Librerf a Campos, 1959), 49-53. 
16 Morales Carrion, Puerto Rico. 306-307. 
11 Tugwell, The Stricken Land, 91-96. 
18 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. Hearings on S.952. A 
Bill to Provide for the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States Over the Island of Puerto 
Rico and for the recognition of its Independence. 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, 9. 
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that the best alternative would be "to consider also the question of some kind of 
autonomous government under which we would retain control of foreign 
relations and military control of the island. I think the (War) department, in 
making their general study of this question, might consider whether that 
condition was not more consistent with the military needs than complete 
independence ... "19 The Senator also recognized that the demands similar to 
those of the people of Puerto Rico for more self-government "may be repeated 
hundredfold all over the world after the war, in the post-war settlement... Many 
islands throughout the world will have semi-autonomous status. This is only 
one phase of the problem ... "20 
President Roosevelt was persuaded by Tugwell 's arguments and 
supported reforming the government of Puerto Rico, but in such a manner that 
the U.S. military presence would not be compromised. In a message to the 
House Committee on Insular Affairs, Pres. Roosevelt outlined the position of his 
administration regarding the future political situation of the island: 
During the 45 years of our sovereignty (over Puerto Rico), the elements of 
world military and naval strategy have changed also. When the island was 
brought under our flag, the Panama Canal had not yet been dug, and the 
airplane had not yet been invented. The Caribbean was something of a 
backwater in the broad current of world affairs. When the present war became 
imminent, however, it was obvious that the chain of islands running in a great 
arc from Florida to the shoulder of South America, enclosing the Caribbean 
Sea, formed a vast natural shield for the Panama Canal. .. And of this island 
shield, Puerto Rico is the center. Its possession or control by any foreign 
power -or even the remote threat of such a possession- would be repugnant 
to the most elementary principles of national defense. 
It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States 
progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories 
and island possessions. The principles for which we are now fighting require 
that of all our citizens -whether continental or overseas- to the greatest 
possible degree of home rule and also of participation in the benefits and 
responsibilities of our Federal system. 
Puerto Ricans of all political parties, however divergent their views as to the 
'
0 Ibid., 20. 
20 U.S. Congress, Hearings on S.952. 21. 
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political future of the island, are united in asking for the right to elect their own 
Governor. I believe that they are entitled to it... The fiscal relationship of the 
insular government to the Federal Government would not be altered, nor 
would the ultimate power of Congress to legislate for the Territory.21 
Congress failed to act on any of the proposed bills, but the hearings had 
served as way to discuss the possible alternatives for reform in Puerto Rico. 
Clearly, the interest of the military in maintaining their presence on the island 
was the overriding factor for the United States. Both Congress and President 
Roosevelt believed that independence would interfere with the unimpeded use 
of the island by the military, but also realized that the current administrative 
situation was intolerable to most Puerto Ricans. Statehood was out of the 
question because there was no support for it either in Washington (few in 
Congress were willing to accept an economically depressed territory as a state, 
much less one with different language, culture and ethnic composition), or in 
Puerto Rico (where the majority party, the PPD was still officially pro-
independence). Some type of autonomy emerged as the only viable alternative 
to the problem of the status. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was ready to 
act Sensing this change in political climate, Tugwell decided to hasten the 
process of reform by announcing in December of 1945, his intent to resign from 
the governorship expecting that President Harry S. Truman (who succeeded 
Roosevelt after the latter's death earlier in 1945) would appoint a Puerto Rican 
to the post. 
On July 25, 1946, President Truman took a momentous step forward in 
U.S.-Puerto Rican relations. He appointed the first Puerto Rican ever, Jesus T. 
Pinero, as Governor of the island. Ten months later, on May 2, 1947, 
21 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. To amend the act to 
provide a civil government for Puerto Rico. 79th Congress, 1st Session., 26 August 1944. 
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Representative Fred L. Crawford of Michigan, introduced legislation to make the 
governorship of Puerto Rico an elective office. 22 The U.S. government was 
beginning to implement the first basic reforms that Tugwell and Munoz Marfn 
had requested since 1941. On August 5, 1947, President Truman signed this 
bill, Public Law 362, that also provided for the Puerto Rican Governor to name 
all the Secretaries for the Cabinet with the advice and consent of the Insular 
Senate. 23 Another important part of this law was the creation of the position of 
"Coordinator of Federal Agencies in Puerto Rico", a functionary appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, to supervise the administration 
of Federal programs in the island. Clearly, the intention was to retain a measure 
of control from Washington at the same time that greater autonomy was 
conceded to the island. 
At this time, however, the PPD had to resolve an internal debate between 
the proponents of independence and those of autonomy. Munoz Marfn himself 
had undergone a transformation in his philosophical approach to the status 
question. In 1938 he left the Partido Liberal after it abandoned the ideal of 
independence. Ten years later Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia (a Popular 
leader who had initially followed Albizu Campos) threatened to do the same to 
the PPD. Concepcion de Gracia pressed Munoz Marin to reiterate that 
independence remained the official goal of the party, but Munoz Marfn replied 
that he was more concerned with solving the problems of the island and the 
status issue realistically. The pro-independence wing of the PPD then split and 
formed, on October 27, 1946, the Partido lndependentista Puertorriqueno 
22 U.S. Congress, House, Elective Governorship for Puerto Rico. 80th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 
3309, Congressional Record (2 May 1947). 
23 For the full text of Public Law 362, see Albert P. Blaustein and Eric B. Blaustein, 
Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(Dobbs ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 19771. 
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(Puerto Rican Independence Party), or PIP 
Although Munoz Madn was formerly a staunch defender of independence 
for the island, his close association with Governor Tugwell and the latter's 
commitment toward improving the situation of Puerto Ricans, plus the 
realization that with enough prodding ( even after the previous failures of 
Congress to do something), the United States would eventually act on behalf of 
the island, convinced Munoz Marfn that some sort of autonomy within the Union 
would allow Puerto Rico to achieve a greater measure of self-government, while 
at the same time retaining economic benefits derived from free access to U.S. 
markets and Federal aid grants. 24 
In June of 1946 Munoz Marf n first openly discussed his new approach 
regarding the future status of the island in a series of articles published in the 
Puerto Rican daily El Mundo. 25 He considered that the changes in the world 
since the end of World War 11 meant that a new evaluation be made of the option 
available to the country. Emphasizing the interdependency of the world, 
especially of the democratic West led by the United States, he maintained that 
complete sovereignty was no longer needed as a tool to improve the condition 
of a people. Munoz Marfn was convinced that any future status should be 
considered principally by how the people would benefit in practice. Munoz 
Marfn was convinced that the economic and social situation of the island made 
statehood impossible, and that independence without special bilateral 
arrangements (unlikely to be granted by Congress) would also be impossible. 
As leader of the PPD Munoz Marfn would very likely become the first 
2
• Surendra Shana, The United States and the Development of the Puerto Rican Status 
Question: 1936-1968 (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1975), 88-89. 
26 Thomas Aitken Jr., Poet in The Fortress,(New York, The American Library of World 
Literature, inc.,1964) 176-177. 
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elected governor of the island, after the election of 1948. By his clever 
separation for practical purposes of the issues of autonomy and the final 
political status of Puerto Rico, he managed to gather the support of Congress on 
the bills granting more self-government to the island. The attitude in Congress 
was one of paternalistic concern for the administration of Puerto Rico with the 
comfortable knowledge that ultimate control over the island still remained in 
Washington. U.S. officials and Munoz Marfn realized that the elective governor 
measure was but a first step down the road of greater reforms and changes 
concerning the relationship between the island and the United States. 
In November 1948 the PPD, as anticipated, won the election by a wide 
margin. Lufs Munoz Marfn became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico, 
and now would have the opportunity to elaborate on his concept of autonomy. 
Even if the Populares had wanted to sidestep the issue of the status in this 
election, the other political parties kept it alive. The pro-statehood forces 
gathered under the new Partido Republicano Estadista (Statehood Republican 
Party) and its leader the wealthy industrialist Luf s A. Ferre. At the same time, 
the pro-independence PIP, under Concepci6n de Gracia, entered their first 
electoral contest. 
Because the status question remained the focus of Puerto Rican politics, 
the PPD defined precisely their new autonomous alternative. Munoz Marfn 
insisted that: 
The people of Puerto Rico should authorize with their votes the following 
request: that the Congress of the United states by law fulfills the self-
governing of Puerto Rico to the utmost without becoming a State within the 
constitutional structure of the United states. That is, that the people of Puerto 
Rico be authorized to make its own constitution, in the same fashion that new 
States are authorized; that the economic relations between Puerto Rico and 
the United States continue essentially the same ... This will establish the 
largest possible measure of self-government that some times under the name 
of autonomy, some times under the name of Dominion, some times under 
other names, has been one of the solutions proposed through history in 
Puerto Rico. 26 
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The proposal for such a status was offered to Congress early in 1950. The 
bill now under consideration would replace the Jones Act by a new document 
reaffirming the economic interdependence of Puerto Rico and the United 
States, and the Federal jurisdiction of several areas of government ( for 
example, defense, currency, coastal shipping, immigration). Also, the island 
would continue to have only the non-voting Resident Commissioner as 
representative to Congress, but in return no Federal taxes would be levied. 
Fern6s lsern, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, worked 
in Congress to get the support needed for the realization of the constitutional 
goal. The proposed bill, H.R. 7674, recognized the principle of government by 
consent and stated that its passage would be regarded as having been adopted 
in the nature of a compact between the peoples of Puerto Rico and the United 
States. 21 This settled the basic characteristics of the Constitution that would then 
be drafted and presented for ratification to the people of Puerto Rico. 
By July of 1950 both the Senate and the House, after reaching agreement 
on the bill, presented it to the President for his signature. On July 3, 1950, 
President Truman signed the bill into Public Law 600. 28 As part of this package, 
a referendum was expected to be held on July of 1951 . 
U.S. defense strategists were concerned with the future of the many military 
26 Speech given by Lurs Munoz Marrn during the acts of commemoration of the 
independence of the United States, on July 4, 1948. In Seij6 Bruno, La insurrecci6n nacionalista. 
37. 
21 U.S. Congress, House, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 7674, 
Congressional Record, 13 March 1950, H3260. 
25 Fern6s lsern, Estado Libre Asociado, 108-109. 
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installations in Puerto Rico. Indeed, Ramey Air Force Base in Aguadilla, 
Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba and the Atlantic Fleet target range and 
practice area on Vieques Island were regarded as key and irreplaceable. 29 
These bases had proven their value during World War II against the German 
submarines that preyed on Allied shipping in the area, and they would continue 
to be important against any possible Soviet threat to the Panama Canal and the 
Caribbean Sea trade routes. This strategic value is further reflected by the fact 
that the U.S. military requested expansion and modernization of existing 
facilities on the island. In the words of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal: 
(i)n developing its post-war plans, the Navy Department has found it 
necessary to give careful consideration to the requirements of the Atlantic 
Fleet for adequate training areas in the Caribbean area, particularly for 
amphibious operations and firing practice. Its studies demonstrate 
conclusively that this area will assume great strategic importance in the post-
war era ... 3() 
Military leaders must have been satisfied that the political changes taking 
place on the island would not impair their activities. In a period of heightened 
security-consciousness, many legislators in Congress were reassured that the 
Navy and Army holdings and operations would remain unaffected on an island 
that guarded the entrance to the Caribbean. 
While these discussion were taking place in Washington, new 
developments in Puerto Rico would dramatize the urgency for political reform. 
The leader of the Nacionalistas, Pedro Albizu Campos, after serving his ten 
year sentence in Federal prison, was freed and returned to a much changed 
island on December 15, 1947. He immediately set out to reorganize the party 
29 Jorge Rodiguez-Beruff, Politica military dominaci6n: Puerto Rico en el contexto latino-
americano (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracan, 1988), 41-44. 
30 Letter from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to Secretary of the Interior Frederick 
Krug, May 27, 1947, quoted in Bhana, The United States and the Development, 108. 
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and to confront Munoz Marfn for the latter's abandonment of the ideal of 
independence. Albizu Campos also denounced the process initiated by the 
Public Law 600 as just the continuation of the same U.S. colonial control of the 
island under another guise. 31 
The Partido Nacionalista announced that it would not participate on the 
scheduled referendum, but while rejecting any further pro-independence 
political action, Albizu Campos was determined to achieve independence 
through revolutionary action. On October 29, 1950, he launched a general 
uprising against the Insular Government. The plan called for the Nacionalistas 
to stage a series of coordinated attacks on police stations and other government 
buildings across the island. Due to the fact that the police had infiltrated 
informants among the Nacionalistas, and since the party lacked training, 
organization and weapons, only a few groups actually carried out their orders. 
In the towns of Arecibo, Penuelas and Jayuya the Nacionalistas were easily 
repulsed. An attempt to storm La Fortaleza (the official governor's residence), 
and assassinate Munoz Marfn also failed after a fierce gun battle that left four 
Nacionalistas dead. 32 Governor Munoz Marf n ordered the National Guard into 
action, but he did not request Federal troops. The largest action of the revolt 
took place in the town of Utuado. Albizu Campos planned to hold out in this 
small and inaccessible mountain village for at least a month, convinced that 
protests from countries opposed to colonialism at the United Nations would 
force the United States to grant the island independence. 33 As it was, the short-
lived revolt was crushed by November 2. Albizu Campos was captured and 
31 Seij6 Bruno, La insurrecci6n nacionalista. 39. 
32 Gregorio Hernandez Rivera, only member of the Nacionalista group that survived the attack, 
declared that during the firefight he saw Muf'loz Marin standing in front of a window and fired at 
him, missing just by inches. Interview on Seij6 Bruno, La insurrecci6n nacionalista, 164. 
33 Interview with Elio Torresola, second in comand of the Partido Nacionalista, Ibid., 139. 
I 
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eventually sentenced again to federal prison in the United States. One last 
incident, that captured world-wide attention, was the attempt on the life of 
President Truman. During the attack on the Blair House, used temporarily by 
Truman as his official residence, one Nacionalista and one presidential guard 
were killed. 34 
The insurrection did not impede the political dialogue between the U.S. 
and Governor Munoz Marfn. The rapid and efficient suppression of the unrest 
by the local authorities made it clear that Albizu Campos and the Partido 
Nacionalista were a small discontented minority. Also the fact that Munoz Marfn 
himself was a target reaffirmed his own prestige as a moderate who was firmly 
committed to democracy and thus perceived as an enemy by the anti-U.S forces 
in the island. In fact, Congress seemed more determined than ever speed up 
the resolution of the status question, particularly since the unrest in Puerto Rico 
came at the same time as the start of the Korean Conflict in June of 1950, which 
worsened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
The U.S. was determined to stop the expansion of the Soviet-supported 
communist regime of North Korea after the latter's invasion of the South, and at 
the same time deter the Soviets from further military aggression in Asia and 
elsewhere. It was determined that since, at least for the moment, the possibility 
of a world war was low the defense of the Caribbean was less important than 
the reinforcing of the U.S. troops engaged in Korea. Part of the ensuing build-up 
included the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment, that joined the action on 
September of 1950. The many commendations and awards earned by this unit 
also served to reassure the U.S. military, after the Nacionalista revolt, of the 
34 On September 12, 1979 President Jimmy Carter pardoned Oscar Collazo, who had 
participated in this attack and had been sentenced to life in prison. 
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dependability of Puerto Ricans serving in the armed forces. 35 
On June 4, 1951, Puerto Ricans went to the polls and approved the 
referendum to select a Constituent Assembly in charge of drafting a constitution. 
Less than a year latter, on March 3, 1952, the final document was endorsed by 
the people of Puerto Rico. This constitution created a new relationship between 
the United States and Puerto Rico, significantly different from the past 
arrangements under the Foraker and Jones Act. Apart from incorporating 
previously granted reforms, such as the elected governorship, the new 
arrangement provided for the establishment of an Estado Libre Asociado (Free 
Associated State), or Commonwealth based on a "compact" between the 
people of Puerto Rico and Congress. The definition of the Commonwealth then 
was that of special association with the United States, 38 that did not preclude 
future changes. The government of Puerto Rico could then negotiate with 
Congress the application of federal laws and regulations on the island. A 
common citizenship would provide the basic link with the United States. 
However, even as the Commonwealth was hailed by the PPD as the best 
possible instrument to achieve both political self-determination and improve the 
economy of the island, Munoz Marin should have realized that the old Carta 
Auton6mica negotiated between his father and the Spanish government 
granted more autonomy to the island than this new constitution. The provisions 
of the Carta Auton6mica, could only be changed with the approval of the Insular 
legislature. The Puerto Rican legislature, however, could modify laws passed 
by the Spanish Parliament to better reflect the conditions in the island. While 
35 For further information on the 65th Inf. Reg. in Korea, see Brig. Gen. W.W. Harris, Puerto 
Rico's Fighting 65th ~ Infantry. (San Rafael, Cal., Presidio Press, 1980). These are the 
memories of the commander of the regiment during this period. 
36 For the text of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, see appendix 2. 
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the Gobernador-General (Governor) was still appointed by the Spanish Crown, 
his functions were designed largely toward overseeing the readiness of the 
military. Since he lacked veto power, the Gobernador-General could do very 
little to oppose laws enacted by the autonomic government, except request 
arbitration by the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom. The Autonomic 
Government of 1897 led by Lufs Munoz Rivera had also the power to negotiate 
trade agreements with other countries, to control the territorial waters of the 
island, to raise revenue through the levy of duties on imports (Spanish as well 
as foreign) and exports, and to issue currency. Lastly, Puerto Ricans, as 
Spanish citizens, could also elect representatives to the Cortes on an equal 
footing with the rest of Spain. 
Under the Commonwealth, the Puerto Rican legislature could not make 
laws in areas specifically allotted to the Congress in Washington under the U.S. 
Constitution. Thus the making of treaties with other countries, the power to 
regulate commerce between the island and the United States and the rest of the 
world, control of the territorial waters, immigration, issuance of currency, plus 
matters of defense and the military, all remained under the direct control of the 
U.S. Federal government. Moreover, all laws (including the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth) could be rescinded or altered unilaterally by the U.S. 
Congress. The Commonwealth retained from the Jones Act, as only 
representative before Congress, the position of the Resident Commissioner in 
Washington. The Resident Commissioner, as previously mentioned, could not 
vote or present legislation even on matters that have a direct impact on the 
island. Without full participation in Congress, however, Puerto Ricans are 
exempt from paying Federal taxes. This was also extended to corporations 
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doing business in Puerto Rico (section 936 of the Internal Revenue Act), 37 
providing a strong incentive for U.S. corporations to relocate their production 
facilities to the island. 
After Congress approved of the new constitution, Gov. Munoz Marrn 
proclaimed the Estado Libre Asociado on July 25, 1952 (the fifty-fourth 
anniversary of the U.S. invasion of the island during the Spanish-American War 
in 1898). The reaction of Congress was very enthusiastic regarding the efforts 
for self-government made by Puerto Ricans. However, influential groups who 
endorsed the measure did so in the knowledge that Congress retained the right 
to decide Puerto Rico's final political status. This attitude combined with a 
paternalistic sense of responsibility was reflected in comments made by 
Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota:" ... you cannot expect to take a 
child in the third grade or sixth grade and move him up into a postgraduate 
school without the various grades between. "38 
The fact is that Puerto Rican politicians had a long history of dealings with 
metropolitan colonial governments going back to the drafting of the first 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain in 1812, to the 1897 Carta Auton6mica 
granted by Spain just before the Spanish-American War, and also the relations 
during the first fifty years of U.S. rule. Therefore, this practical experience had 
more than prepared Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans to manage their own 
internal affairs. Also, a careful comparison of the powers granted to Puerto Rico 
under the Commonwealth reveals that they are not as extensive as those 
37 Section 936, the "Possessions Tax Credit", offers tax incentives to American companies in 
order to encourage manufacturing investment in Puerto Rico and certain other U.S. possessions. 
Specifically, it allows federal income tax credits for income from target industries in these locations. 
Puerto Rico-U.S.A. Foundation, Section 936: The Keystone for U.S.-Puerto Rico Economic 
Growth, n.p., n.d. 
3
• Shana, The United States and the Development, 132. 
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provided by the Carta Auton6mica. However, just as Luf s Munoz Rivera had 
done in 1896, his son Muiioz Marf n had seized the opportunity afforded by 
concerns with international events in the ruling colonial power. The autonomic 
arrangements obtained by both father and son constituted great advances in 
the quest for political and economic self-determination for the people of Puerto 
Rico. 
61 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Following the adoption of the Estado Libre Asociado, Governor Munoz 
Marin asked President Eisenhower that no additional reports on the condition of 
the island be sent to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, arguing that 
Puerto Rico now enjoyed self-government and a wide range of autonomy. On 
November 27, 1953, the General Assembly agreed with the U.S. position that 
Puerto Rico was no longer a dependent territory, 1 and the annual reports were 
discontinued. 
The new political status, however, failed to provide a definitive alternative 
for all groups on the island. Supporters of both statehood and independence, 
realizing that the Commonwealth formula was specifically designed so it could 
be modified or superseded by another, continued their political activities. Due 
to the immense prestige of Luis Munoz Marin, however, the PPD continues to be 
the main party of Puerto Rico. 2 
Since the 1950 Nacionalista uprising, however, the pro-independence 
Partido lndependentista Puertorrigueno, sponsoring the peaceful transition to 
full sovereignty, has gained wide acceptance among some sectors of society. 
University students, young professionals and second generation Puerto Ricans 
living in the continental U.S. oppose statehood and have become disillusioned 
with Commonwealth as a permanent solution. 3 More radical groups, such as the 
Ejercito Popular Boricua (Popular "Boricua" Army), also known as Los 
1 United Nations General assembly Document A/Resolution/151, November 30, 1953. 
2 Luis A. Davila Colon, "Los '80: La decada del colapso", El Nueyo Dia, (San Juan, Puerto 
Rico), December 30, 1989. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
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Macheteros. have conducted a sporadic violent terrorist campaign against the 
continued military presence of the United States. hoping that it would force the 
U.S. to grant independence to Puerto Rico. Their first major operation was the 
ambush of a group of U.S. Navy personnel on Sabana Seca on December of 
1979. killing 2 and wounding several others. 4 Their most spectacular actions 
included their attack in January of 1981 upon Muniz Air Base. near San Juan. 
which resulted in· the destruction of A-7 jet fighters of the Puerto Rican Air 
National Guard.5 and the robbery of seven million dollars from a Wells Fargo 
armored car in Hartford. Connecticut (1983). A concerted effort by the F.B.I. and 
the local police managed to disband the organization after a series of arrests 
during 1985. 
On the other end of the political spectrum. the pro-statehood party. the 
Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party) or PNP, eroded the PPD's 
traditional support from the lower income groups. Four times. in 1968. 1976, 
1980 and 1992. the PNP captured the governorship of the island. Also. the PNP 
extracted promises of the acceptance of Puerto Rico as a State of the Union 
from Presidents Ford. Reagan and Bush if the people of the island should vote 
for that on a referendum. 
The continued military and strategic importance of Puerto Rico was amply 
demonstrated by the utilization of Puerto Rican bases in support of major 
military actions in the Caribbean region. The rise to power in Cuba of Fidel 
Castro on 1959 again focused the attention of the United States toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The administrations of Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson were worried that the Soviet foothold in the Western Hemisphere 
4 El Nuevo Dfa. (San Juan, Puerto Rico), December 4, 1979. 
5 Ibid., January 11, 1981. 
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would be just the beginning of a concerted Soviet-Cuban effort to destabilize 
that part of the world. The U.S. intervention in the civil war then raging in the 
Dominican Republic on April of 1965, simultaneous to the escalating U.S. 
military involvement on the long-running war in Vietnam, was an expression of 
this new policy of containment in Latin America. On that occasion Ramey Air 
Force base in the northwestern part of Puerto Rico, was the key staging area for 
the units of the 82nd Airborne Division that led the invasion force into Santo 
Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. 6 During the intervention on 
Grenada on October of 1983, Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, near Ceiba in 
eastern Puerto Rico, was used as a refueling stop, to stockpile supplies and 
also as a base for sophisticated radar surveillance planes (E-3 AWACs) and F-
15 jet fighters whose mission was to intercept any airlift of reinforcements from 
Cuba to Grenada. 1 The base in Roosevelt Roads was again used for refueling 
and as casualty evacuation destination during the invasion of Panama on 
December 20, 1989.8 
The island of Vieques, off the east coast of Puerto Rico, is still the major 
training area for the Navy and Marine forces in the Atlantic Fleet, that includes 
over one hundred and fifty ships and six carrier air wings. Combined-arms 
exercises and naval gunfire and aviation target practice are conducted on the 
island throughout the year.9 The mountain regions of the interior are routinely 
utilized as "jungle" training facilities for U.S. Special Forces, Marines and the 
Puerto Rican National Guard, as well as by the forces of allied countries such as 
5 Rodriguez-Beruff. Politica military dominaci6n. 162. 
1 Major Mark Aitken, Urgent Fury. The Battle for Grenada. (Lexington, Massachussets: 
Lexington Books, 1989), 141. 
8 Gordon Rottman, Panama 1989-1990. (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1991), 22-23. 
9 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Panel to Review the 
Status of the Naw Training activities on the island of Viegues (96th Cong, 2nd sess., 1981), 8. 
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the Netherlands, Britain, Brazil and Venezuela. ' 0 
The value of Vieques to the operations of the U.S. Navy was described by 
Vice-Admiral T.J. Bigley, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on September 
12, 1978 as follows: 
The strategic importance of Vieques is mainly in its geographic location 
and the prepositioned ammunition stocks needed in support of Navy and 
Marine Corps deployed units. If the use of the Vieques Ammunition Facility 
were denied, logistics flexibility to support operational units would be 
unacceptably restricted. 11 
This view was also echoed by the former commander of the U.S. forces in the 
Caribbean, Rear Admiral Arthur Knoizen on January 18, 1979 during an 
interview with a newspaper from the region: 
We need to stay here in the Caribbean and continue our training. Vieques 
is a key part of our operation. If you want national defense you have to keep 
the Navy strong. Only if the Navy is strong will we be able to protect 
[the United States]. 12 
At the present time the main military bases and installations of the U.S. 
armed forces in Puerto Rico were as follows: Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in 
Ceiba, comprised of a complex of airfields, ammunition and supply stockpiles, 
and repair facilities to support the operations of the Atlantic Fleet; Camp Garcfa 
training grounds in Vieques, used for "wargames" during amphibious landing 
operations; Sabana Seca, communications and radar warning site in western 
Puerto Rico; Camp Tortuguero, training and maneuvers site along the northern 
coast between San Juan and Arecibo; Salinas Training Center, a large land-air 
10 Ibid, 6. 
11 Deborah Menkart and Catherine A Sunshine, ed., Carribean Connections: Puerto Rico, 
(Washington. D.C., EPICA/NECA, 1990), 94. 
12 Ibid., 94. 
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training facility used now mostly by the Puerto Rican National Guard; Ramey 
Field (Punta Borinquen), a large air base formerly used by the Strategic Air 
Command to house B-52 bomber airplanes. The Air Force retired the planes 
and turned the base over to the government of Puerto Rico in 1973, but its 
installations are still used by the Puerto Rican National Guard, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and at times by the U.S. Navy; and the Barrio Guerrero Naval 
Communication Station in lsabela, a complex of radio antennae and electronic 
equipment used by the Navy to enhance the communications capabilities 
between the ships of the Atlantic Fleet and their I Ieadquarters in the United 
States. 13 The Caribbean National Forest, a park under the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Interior Department, was also used during the 1960's as testing ground for 
defoliants such as "Agent Orange" latter used during the Vietnam War. 
The political situation of Puerto Rico, in the end, has remained basically 
unchanged since the U.S. took over the island. The major political and fiscal 
issues must still be cleared through Washington before any decision is 
implemented by the local authorities. Meanwhile the U.S. military presence 
continues to be very much in evidence and the social, economic and 
psychological links between the island and the mainland are strongly imprinted 
on the population of Puerto Rico. 
The decision of the Truman administration to grant political autonomy to the 
island in response to the rising nationalist sentiments and the pressing need for 
political reform evident in the island immediately after the end of World War 11 
has paid off handsomely for the U.S. This action defused the issue of the 
United States posing as the world-wide defender of democracy while at the 
1
" Andres Ponce. civilian technician employed by the Navy at the site, interview by author. 13 
July 1990. lsabela, Puerto Rico. 
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same time denying self-government to the more than two million Puerto Ricans 
in 1950. Also, a smooth transition to a reform government, under a popular 
leader, was accomplished without any major complication (excepting the 1950 
Nacionalista uprising) and thus guaranteed the permanency and availability of 
U.S. military installations on the island. 
The credit for the development of the Estado Libre Asociado lies. of course, 
with Lufs Munoz Marfn. He alone among the major political figures in Puerto 
Rico had the vision to recognize that the island needed first to rebuild its 
economic base and start the process of resolving the many pressing social 
ailments of the country. For him, any serious consideration cannot be given to 
either full integration into the U.S. as a state, or full sovereignty as an 
independent country until the critical problems of poverty, malnutrition and 
unemployment were dealt with. After serving as governor from 1948 to 1964, 
Munoz Marfn retired from active politics, leaving the field open for a new 
generation of leaders in the PPD. Lufs Munoz Marfn died on April 30, 1980, 
after realizing his dream for prosperity through autonomy. 
The current political prospects for the island are not clear. A non-binding 
referendum held on November 14, 1993 by the new PNP administration of 
Governor Pedro Roseli6 resulted in an extremely close vote in support of 
sending a delegation to negotiate with Congress the improvement of the current 
Commonwealth through the granting of more powers and the inclusion of the 
island on additional assistance programs. The voting results, 48.5 % for 
Commonwealth, 46 % for statehood and 5% for independence14 also indicate 
that while the overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans support a continued 
political link with the U.S., there is a lack of consensus on whether autonomy or 
1
• El Nuevo Dfa, (San Juan, Puerto Rico), November 15, 1993 
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statehood would provide the best vehicle for a such a relationship. Any move 
toward either an "improved" Commonwealth or statehood would require the 
support of a significant majority of Puerto Ricans in order to be approved by 
Congress. It also raises the question of how to integrate a people whose 
language is not English, with a very different cultural and racial heritage, and 
who had demonstrated a great resilience in protecting their national character 
in opposition to the assimilist policies of the colonial administrations of the past. 
Contributing to the changing political picture of Puerto Rico is the end of the 
Cold War. This has reduced considerably the need for the U.S. to maintain 
large numbers of military forces deployed arour.d the world and also in the 
Caribbean. The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the end of the civil 
wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and led to a considerable weakening of 
Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. Without a clear threat to it's security and interest 
in the Caribbean Basin region, the United States could conceivable decide in 
the near future that the fiscal expense of supporting the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico is greater than any real benefit derived from this mutual 
relationship. However, it is important to point out that even without the menace 
of foreign military aggression or political infiltration, the U.S. would always need 
to remain involved in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
The recent massive exodus of Haitian refugees fleeing their country and 
requesting political asylum in the United States, due to repressive policies of 
the military junta that deposed the democratically-elected government of Jean 
Betrand Aristide in 1991, is but one example of the type of local instability that 
might require the utilization of U.S. military power in the region. The advantage 
for the United States of freedom of access to the military and logistical facilities 
in the island for this type of situations was demonstrated in September of 1980, 
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when President Carter faced a much smaller influx of Haitian boat people 
escaping the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Hundreds of Haitians were 
sent to the Ft. Allen, a formerly mothballed army base in southern Puerto Rico, 
while their asylum claims were evaluated. 15 For the administration it was much 
safer to send the refugees here, as Puerto Ricans cannot vote in presidential 
elections and lack effective representation in Congress, than to cope with the 
domestic opposition that was bound to arise due to the unpopularity of admitting 
Haitians into the United States. The most recent instance of the usefulness of 
Puerto Rico for the U.S. military took place during October and November of 
1994. Several bases were reactivated to serve as training centers for troops 
from Jamaica, Barbados and other Caribbean island-nations that were to be 
part of the peace-keeping forces sent to Haiti in support of President Aristide 
after the military junta was deposed by the U.S. intervention in October of 1994. 
Also the military installations in Puerto Rico are currently involved in the 
efforts to interdict the traffic of drugs coming from South America into the United 
States. The relative proximity of the Colombian coast plus the fact that 
passenger and cargo traveling between Puerto Rico and the mainland is 
exempt from customs inspection, translates into an increase in smuggling 
activities. 16 
The economic picture of the island clearly reflects the rapid development 
that r1as taken place since 1952. Puerto Rico is the world's 10th largest 
purchaser of goods and services from the United States. Manufacturing 
accounts for 41 % of the island's $34 billion Gross Domestic Product. Puerto 
15 Raymond L. Gerdes, "Fort Allen 1981: Una ciudad improvisada", El Nuevo Dia (San Juan, 
Puerto Rico) July 3, 1994, sec. Domingo, 4-8. 
16 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropiations. Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal 
Service and General Government. Bahamas and Puerto Rico: Drug Interdiction Activities. Hearing 
before a subcommitee of appropiations. U.S. Senate, 100th Cong 2nd sess., 1988. 
69 
Rico's major industries include chemicals, textiles and electronic equipment, 
and rs currently the world's largest producer of pharmaceuticals. Tourism 
comprise about 6% of the Gross Domestic Product. Meanwhile the traditional 
agricultural production of sugar cane, coffee, bananas and pineapples has 
( 
diminished to secondary importance. 11 
The geographical situation of the island is the constant factor that has made 
Puerto Rico an important player in the political and strategic events of the 
Caribbean for close to five-hundred years. First fortified by Spain to provide 
security to the galleon fleets in the sixteen century, the island location proved 
still equally useful to the United States in combating German submarines during 
World War II, supporting military interventions in neighboring countries during 
the Cold War and in confronting the new problems of enforcing U.S. laws 
against undocumented immigration and illegal drug traffic. 
The continued political stability of this key island, achieved with the 
implementation of the self-governing commonwealth status in 1952, is 
something that cannot be ignored by those nations who consider vital to their 
interests a policy of engagement in the affairs of the region. 
11 Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration, Puerto Rico Overview. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government of Puerto Rico, 1994), 1-3. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CARTA AUTONOMICA 
(AUTONOMIC CHARTER)1 
ROYAL DECREE 
Upon the proposition of my Prime Minister, and with the concurrence of the 
Council of Ministers in the name of My August Son, King Alfonso XIII, and as Queen 
Regent of the Kingdom, I hereby decree as follows: 
TITLEI 
Government and Administration of the Island of Puerto Rico. 
Article 1 . The island of Puerto Rico shall hereafter be governed and 
administered in conformity with the following provisions. 
Article 2. The island shall be governed by an Insular Parliament, consisting of 
two chambers, and by the Governor-General, representing the mother country, who 
shall exercise supreme authority. 
TITLEII 
The Insular Chambers. 
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Article 3. The insular chambers, together with the Governor-General, shall have 
power to legislate concerning colonial affairs in the manner and on the terms provided 
by law. 
Article 4. Insular representation shall consist of two bodies of equal powers, 
which shall be known as Chamber of Representatives and Council of Administration. 
TITLE Ill 
Council of Administration. 
Article 5. The Council shall be composed of fifteen members, of whom eight 
shall be elected in the manner directed by the electoral law, and seven shall be 
designated by the Governor-General acting for the Crown, from among such persons 
as have the qualifications specified in the following articles: 
Article 6. To be entitled to sit in the Council of Administration it is necessary to 
be a Spanish subject; to have attained the age of thirty-five years; to have been born 
on the island, or to have had four years' constant residence therein; not to be subject 
to any pending criminal prosecution; to be in the full enjoyment of his political rights; to 
1 This English translation of the Carta Auton6mica is found in Clifford S. Walton, The Civil Law in Spain 
and Spanjsh-America (Washington, D.C.W.H, Lowdermilk & Co., 1900), 573-587. 
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have his property free from attachment; to have had for two or more years previous an 
annual income of four thousand pesos; to have no interest in any contract with either 
the insular of the home Government. 
The shareholders of a stock company shall not be considered as government 
contractors, even if the company has a contract with the Government. 
Article 7. Persons who are also qualified to serve as councilors who, beside the 
above-stated requirements, have any of the following qualifications: 
1. To be or to have been a senator of the Kingdom, or to possess the requirements 
for being a Senator, in conformity with Article Ill of the Constitution. 
2. To have held for a period of two years any of the following offices: President or 
prosecuting attorney of the Territorial Audiencia (Court) of Puerto Rico; Director of the 
lnstituto de San Juan: Councilor of Administration in the Council formerly thus 
designated: President of the Chambers of Commerce of San Juan and Ponce; 
President of the Economic Society of Friends of the Country of Puerto Rico; President 
of the Agriculturalists' Association: Dean of the Illustrious Bar of San Juan; Mayor of 
San Juan or President of the Provincial Assembly during two terms: Dean of chapter of 
the cathedral. 
3. Likewise may be elected or appointed any property-owner from the fifty taxpayers 
paying the highest taxes, either on real state or on industries, commerce, arts, and the 
professions. 
Article 8. The Councilors appointed by the Crown shall be appointed by special 
decrees, stating the qualifications entitling the appointee to serve as Councilor. 
Councilors thus appointed shall hold office for life. 
One-half the number of the elective Councilors shall be elected every five years, and 
the whole number shall be elected whenever the Council of Administration shall be 
dissolved by the Governor-General. 
Article 9. The qualifications required in order to be appointed or elected 
Councilor of Administration may be changed by a national law at the request or upon 
proposition of the Insular Chambers. 
Article 1 o. No councilor shall, during the session of the Council, accept any civic 
office, promotion (unless it be strictly by seniority), title, or decoration; but any councilor 
may be appointed by either the local or the home Government to any commission 
within his own profession or category, whenever the public service shall require it. 
The secretaries of the insular Government shall be excepted from the foregoing rule. 
TITLE IV 
The Chamber of Representatives. 
Article 11 . The Chamber of Representatives shall be composed of members 
named by the electoral boards in the manner prescribed by law and in the proportion 
72 
of one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants. 
Article 12. To be elected as Representative the candidate must have the 
following requirements: To be a Spanish citizen, to be a layman, to have attained his 
majority of age, to be in full enjoyment of civil rights, to have been born in the island or 
to have had four years' constant residence therein, and not to be subject to any 
pending criminal prosecution. 
Aliticle 13. Representatives shall be elected every five years, and any 
Representative may be re-elected any number of times. 
Article 14. Any Representative upon whom either the local or home Government 
shall confer a pension, or any employment, promotion (unless by strict seniority), paid 
commission, title, or decoration, shall cease to be such without necessity of any 
declaration to that effect, unless he shall within fifteen days of his appointment notify 
the Chamber of his having declined the favor. 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not include the Representatives 
who shall be appointed members of the cabinet. 
TITLEV 
Proceedings of the Insular Chambers and Their Relations to Each Other. 
Article 15. The Chambers will meet every year. The King, the Governor-General 
acting in his name, shall convene, suspend, and adjourn the sessions and dissolve 
the Chamber of Representatives and the Council of Administration, either separately 
or simultaneously, under the obligation to call them together again or renew them 
within three months. 
Article 16. Each of the two legislative bodies shall determine the rules of their 
proceedings and shall be the judges of the qualifications of their respective members 
and the legality of their legislation. 
Until the Chamber and the Council shall pass their own rules, they shall be governed 
by the rules of the national House of Representatives and of the Senate, respectively. 
Article 17. Each chamber shall choose its president, vice-president, and 
secretaries. 
Article 18. Neither chamber shall sit unless the other be sitting also, except 
when the Council exercises judicial functions. 
Article 19. The two insular chambers shall not deliberate together nor in the 
presence of the Governor-General. 
The sessions shall be public, but either chamber may hold secret sessions whenever 
business of a private nature shall require it. 
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Article 20. To the Governor-General, through his secretaries, as well as to either 
of the chambers, belongs the power to initiate and propose colonial statutes. 
Article 21. All colonial statutes in regard to taxes and the public credit shall 
originate in the Chamber of Representatives. 
, ,Article 22. Resolutions may be passed by either chamber by a plurality of votes; 
but in order to pass a measure of a legislative character a majority of all the members 
constituting the body must be present. Nevertheless, one-third of the members shall 
constitute a quorum for deliberation. 
Article 23. No resolution or law shall be considered passed by the Insular 
Parliament unless it has had the concurrence of the Chamber of representatives and 
the Council of Administration. 
Article 24. Every colonial statute, as soon as it has been approved in the form 
prescribed in the preceding article, shall be presented to the Governor-General by the 
officers of both chambers for his sanction and proclamation of the same. 
Article 25. Members of the Council and of the Chamber of Representatives shall 
have immunity for any speech or vote in either chamber. 
Article 26. No Councilor of Administration shall be indicted or arrested without a 
previous resolution of the Council, unless he shall be found in fraganti or the Council 
shall not be in session, but in every case notice shall be given to that body as soon as 
possible, that it may determine what should be done. Nor shall the Representatives be 
indicted or arrested during the sessions without the permission of the Chamber unless 
they are found in fraganti, but in this last case. or in case of indictment or arrest when 
the Chamber is not sitting, notice shall be given as soon as possible to the Chamber of 
Representatives for its information and action. All proceedings against Councilors and 
Representatives shall be brought before the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico in the 
cases and manner that shall be prescribed by the colonial statutes. 
Article 27. The guarantees established in the foregoing section shall not apply 
to a Councilor or Representative who shall himself admit that he is the author of any 
article, book, pamphlet, or printed matter wherein military sedition is incited, or national 
sovereignty is assailed. 
Article 28. The relations between the two chambers shall be governed, unless 
otherwise provided, by the act of July 19, 1837, regulating the relations between the 
two legislative houses of the Cortes (national parliament). 
Article 29. Besides the power of enacting laws for the colony the insular 
chambers shall have power to: 
1. To receive the oath of the Governor-General to preserve the Constitution and the 
74 
laws which guarantee the autonomy of the colony. 
2. To enforce the responsibility of the secretaries of the executive, who shall be tried 
by the Council, whenever impeached by the Chamber of Representatives. 
3. To address the home Government though the Governor-General, proposing the 
abrogation or modification of existing laws of the Kingdom; to invite the home 
Government to present bills as to particular matters, or to ask a decision of an 
executive character on matters which interest the colony. 
Article 30. The Governor-General shall communicate to the home Government 
before presenting to the insular parliament any bill originating in the executive 
government of the island whenever, in his judgment, said bill may affect national 
interests. Should any such bill originate in the Insular Parliament, the Government of 
the island shall ask for a postponement of the debate until the home Government shall 
have given its opinion. 
In either case the correspondence passing between the two Governments shall be 
laid before the chambers and published in the Official Gazette. 
Article 31. All differences of jurisdiction between the several municipal, 
provincial and insular assemblies, or between any of them and the executive, which by 
their nature may not be referred to the home Government, shall be submitted to the 
courts of justice in accordance with the rules herein prescribed. 
TITLE VI. 
Powers Vested in the Insular Parliament. 
Article 32. The insular chambers shall have power to pass upon all matters not 
specially and expressly reserved to the Cortes of the Kingdom or to the central 
Government as herein provided, or as may be provide hereafter, in accordance with 
the prescriptions set forth in additional Article 2. 
In this manner, and without implying that the following enumeration presupposes any 
limitation of their power to legislate on other subjects, they shall have power to 
legislate on all matters and subjects concerning the Ministries of Justice, Interior, 
Treasury, Public Works, Education and Agriculture. 
They shall likewise have exclusive cognizance of all matters of a purely local nature 
which may principally affect the colonial territory; and to this end they shall have power 
to legislate on civil administration; on provincial, municipal, or judicial apportionment; 
on public health, by land or sea, and on public credit, banks, and the monetary system. 
This power, however, shall not impair the powers vested in the colonial executive 
according to the laws in connection with the matters above mentioned. 
Article 33. It shall be incumbent upon the colonial parliament to make 
regulations under such national laws as may be passed by the Cortes and expressly 
entrusted to it. Especially among such measures, parliament shall legislate, and may 
do so at the first sitting, for the purpose of regulating the elections, the taking of the 
electoral census, qualifying electors, and exercising the right of suffrage; but in no 
event shall these dispositions affect the rights of the citizens as established by the 
electoral laws. 
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Article 34. Notwithsanding that the laws governing the judiciary and the 
administration of the justice are of a national character, and therefore obligatory for the 
colony, the Insular Parliament may, within the provisions of said laws, make rules or 
propose to the home Government such measures as shall render easier the 
admission, continuance, or promotion in the local courts of lawyers, natives of the 
island, or practicing therein. 
The Governor-General in Council shall have, as far as the island of Puerto Rico is 
• concerned, the same power that has been vested heretofore in the Minister for 
Overseas Territories for the appointment of the functionaries and subordinate and 
auxiliary offices of the judicial order and as to the other matters connected with 
administration of justice. 
Article 35. The Insular Parliament shall have exclusive power to frame the local 
budget of expenditures and revenues, including the revenue corresponding to the 
island as her quota of the national budget. 
To this end the Governor-General shall present to the chambers every year before 
the month of January the budget for the next fiscal year, divided in two parts, as 
follows: The first part shall state the revenues needed to defray the expenses of 
sovereignty, and the second part shall state the revenues and expenditures estimated 
for the maintenance of the colonial administration. 
Article 36. The Cortes of the Kingdom shall determine what expenditures are to 
be considered by reason of their nature as obligatory expenses inherent to 
sovereignty, and shall fix the amount every three years and the revenue needed to 
defray the same, the Cortes reserving the right to alter this rule. 
Article 37. All treaties of commerce affecting the island of Puerto Rico, be they 
suggested by the insular or by the home Government, shall be made by the latter with 
co-operation of special delegates duly authorized by the colonial government, whose 
concurrence shall be acknowledged upon submitting the treaties to the Cortes. 
Said treaties, when approved by the Cortes, shall be proclaimed as laws of the 
Kingdom and as such shall obtain in the colony. 
Article 38. Notice shall be given to the Insular Government of any commercial 
treaties made without its participation as soon as said treaties shall become laws, to 
the end that, within a period of three months, it may declare its acceptance or 
nonacceptance of their stipulations. In case of acceptance the Governor-General shall 
cause the treaty to be published in the Gazette as a colonial statute. 
Article 39. The Insular Parliament shall also have power to frame the tariff and 
.. 
t. 
fix the duties to be paid on merchandise as well tor its importation into the territory of 
the island as tor the exportation thereof. 
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Article 40. As a transition fro the old regime to the one newly established, and 
until the home and insular governments may otherwise conjointly determine hereafter, 
the commercial relations between the island and the metropolis shall be governed by 
the following rules: 
1 . No differential duty, whether fiscal or otherwise, either on imports or exports, shall 
be imposed to the detriment of either insular or peninsular production. 
2. The two governments shall make a schedule of articles of direct national origin to 
which shall be allowed by common consent preferential duty over similar foreign 
products. 
In another schedule made in like manner shall be determined such articles of direct 
insular production as shall be entitled to privileged treatment on their importation into 
the peninsula and the amount of preferential duties thereon. 
In neither case shall the preferential duty exceed thirty-five percent. 
Should both governments agree upon the schedules and the preferential duties, 
they shall be considered final and shall be enforced at once. In case of disagreement 
the point in dispute shall be submitted to a committee of representatives of the Cortes, 
consisting of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and Peninsulars. The committee shall 
appoint its chairman, and in case of disagreement the eldest member shall preside. 
The chairman shall have the casting vote. 
3. The valuation tables concerning the articles in the schedules above mentioned 
shall be fixed by mutual agreement, and shall be revised after discussion every two 
years. The modifications which may thereupon become necessary in the tariff duties 
shall be carried out at once by the respective governments. 
TITLE VII 
The Governor-General. 
Article 41. The supreme authority of the colony shall be vested in a Governor-
General, appointed by the king on the nomination of the Council of Ministers. In his 
capacity he shall have as Viceroyal Patron the power inherent in the Patronate of the 
Indies; he shall have command of all military and naval forces in the island; he shall 
act as delegate of the Ministries of State, War, Navy and Overseas Territories; all other 
authorities in the island shall be subordinate to his, and he shall be responsible for the 
preservation of order and the safety of the colony. 
The Governor-General shall, before taking possession of his office, take an oath in 
the presence of the King to discharge his duties faithfully and loyally. 
Article 42. The Governor-General, representing the nation, will discharge by 
himself and with the aid of his secretaries all the functions indicated in the preceding 
articles and such others as may devolve upon him as direct delegate of the King in 
matters of a national character. 
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It shall be incumbent upon the Governor-General as representing the home 
Government: 
1. To appoint without restriction the secretaries of his cabinet. 
2. To proclaim, execute, and cause to be executed in the island all laws, decrees, 
treaties, international covenants, and all other acts emanating from the legislative 
branch of the Government, as well as all decrees, royal commands, and all other 
measures emanating from the executive which shall be communicated to him by the 
Ministries of of which he acts as delegate. 
Whenever in his judgment and in that of his secretaries he considers the resolutions 
of the home Government as liable to injure the general interests of the nation or the 
special interests of the island, he shall have power to suspend the publication and 
execution thereof, and shall so notify the respective Ministry, stating the reasons for his 
actions. 
3. To grant pardons in the name of the King, within the limitations specially 
prescribed to him in his instructions from the Government, and to stay the execution of 
a death sentence whenever the gravity of circumstances shall so demand or the 
urgency of the case shall allow of no time to solicit and obtain His Majesty's pardon; 
but in either case he shall hear the counsel of his secretaries. 
4. To suspend the guarantees set forth in articles 3, 5, 6, and 9, and in the first, 
second, and third paragraphs of article 13 of the Constitution: to enforce legislation in 
regard to public order, and to take all measures which he may deem necessary to 
preserve the peace within and the safety without the territory entrusted to him after 
hearing the counsel of his cabinet. 
5. To take care that in the colony justice be promptly and fully administered, and that 
it shall always be administered in the name of the King. 
6. To hold direct communication on foreign affairs with the Ministers, diplomatic 
agents, and consuls of Spain throughout America. 
A full copy of such correspondence shall be simultaneously forwarded to the home 
Ministry of State. 
Article 43. It behooves the Governor-General, as the superior authority in the 
colony and head of its administration: 
1. To take care that the rights, powers, and privileges now vested or that may 
henceforth be vested in the colonial administration be respected and protected. 
2. To sanction and proclaim the acts of the Insular Parliament, which shall be 
submitted to him by the president and secretaries of the respective chambers. 
Whenever, in the judgment of the Governor-General, an act of the Insular Parliament 
goes beyond its powers or impairs the rights of the citizens set forth in Article 1 of the 
Constitution, or curtails the guarantees prescribed by law for the exercise of said 
rights, or jeopardize the interest of the colony or of the nation, he shall forward the act 
to the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, which, within a period that shall not exceed 
two months, shall either assent to it or return it to the governor-General with the 
objections to its sanction and proclamation. The Insular Parliament may, in view of the 
objections, reconsider or modify the act, if it deems fit, without a special proposition. 
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If two months shall elapse without the central government giving any opinion as to a 
measure agreed upon by the chambers which has been transmitted to it by the 
Governor-General, the latter shall sanction and proclaim the same. 
3. To appoint, suspend, and discharge the employees of the colonial administration, 
upon the suggestion of the secretaries of the departments and in accordance with the 
laws. 
4. To appoint and remove, without restriction, the secretaries of his cabinet. 
Article 44. No executive order of the Governor-General, acting as representative 
and chief of the colony, shall take effect unless countersigned by a secretary of the 
cabinet, who by this act alone shall make himself responsible for the same. 
Article 45. There shall be five secretaries of department, to-wit: Grace and 
Justice and Interior; Finance; Public Education; Public Works and Communications; 
Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. 
The Governor-General shall appoint the president of the cabinet from among the 
secretaries, and shall also have the power to appoint a president without a 
secretaryship. 
The power to increase or diminish the number of secretaries comprising the colonial 
cabinet, and to determine the scope of each department, is vested in the Insular 
Parliament. 
Article 46. The secretaries of the cabinet may be members of either the 
Chamber of Representatives or the Council of Administration and take part in the 
debates of either chamber, but a secretary shall only vote in the chamber of which he 
is a member. 
Article 47. The secretaries of the cabinet shall be responsible to the Insular 
Parliament. 
Article 48. The Governor-General shall not modify or abrogate his own orders 
after they are assented to by the home Government, or when they shall declare some 
rights, or when a sentence by a judicial court or administrative tribunal shall have been 
based upon said orders, or when they shall deal with his own competency. 
Article 49. The Governor-General shall not turn over his office when leaving the 
island except by special command from the home Government. In case of absence 
from the seat of government which prevents his discharging the duties of his office or 
of disability to perform such duties, he can appoint one or more persons to take his 
place, provided the home Government has not previously done so or the method of 
substitution shall not be stated in his instructions. 
Article 50. The Supreme Court shall have the sole power to try the Governor-
General when impeachment for his responsibilities as defined by the Penal Code. 
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The Council of Ministers shall take cognizance of his other responsibilities. 
Article 51. The Governor-General shall have the power, in spite of the provisions 
of the different articles of this decree, to act upon his own responsibility, without 
consulting his secretaries, in the following cases: 
1. When forwarding to the home Government a bill passed by the Insular Parliament, 
especially when, in his opinion, it shall abridge the rights set forth in Article 1 of the 
ConstiMion of the Monarchy or the guarantees for the exercise thereof vouchsafed by 
the laws. 
2. When it shall be necessary to enforce the law or public order, especially if there be 
no time or possibility to consult the home Government. 
3. When enforcing national laws that shall have been approved by the Crown and 
made applicable to all the Spanish territory or to the colony under his government. 
The proceedings and means of action which the governor-General shall employ in 
the above cases shall be determined by a special law. 
TITLE VIII 
Municipal and Provincial Government. 
Article 52. Municipal organization shall be compulsory for every group of 
population of more than one thousand inhabitants. 
Groups of less number of inhabitants may organize the service of their community by 
special covenants. 
Every legally constituted municipality shall have power to frame its own laws 
regarding public education; highways by land, river and the sea, public health; 
municipal finances, as well as to freely appoint and remove its own employees. 
Article 53. At the head of the province there shall be an assembly, which shall 
be elected in the manner provided for by the colonial statutes, and shall be composed 
of a number of members in proportion to the population. 
Article 54. The provincial assembly shall be autonomous as regards the 
creation and maintenance of public schools and colleges, charitable institutions and 
provincial roads and ways by land, river, or sea; also as regards their own budgets and 
the appointment and removal of their respective employees. 
Article 55. The municipalities, as well as the provincial assembly, shall have 
power to freely raise the necessary revenue to cover their expenditures, which no 
other limitation than to make the means adopted compatible with the general system of 
taxation of the island. 
The resources for provincial appropriations shall be independent of municipal 
resources. 
Article 56. The mayors (alcaldes) and presidents of boards of aldermen 
(tenientes de alcalde} shall be chosen by their respective boards from among their 
members. 
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Article 57. The mayors shall discharge without limitation the active duties of the 
municipal administration, as executors of the resolutions of the board of aldermen or 
their representatives. 
Article 58. The aldermen (consejales} and the provincial assemblymen shall be 
civilly responsible for the damages caused by their acts. 
Article 59. The provincial assemblies shall freely choose their respective 
presidents. 
Article 60. The elections of aldermen and assemblymen shall be conducted in 
such a manner as to allow for a legitimate representation of the minorities. 
Article 61. The provincial and municipal laws now in effect in the island shall 
continue in vogue, wherever not in conflict with the provisions of this decree, until the 
Insular Parliament shall legislate in this matter. 
Article 62. No colonial statute shall abridge the powers vested by the preceding 
articles in the municipalities and the provincial assemblies. 
TITLE IX 
As to the Guarantees for the Fulfillment of this Colonial Constitution. 
Article 63. Whenever a citizen shall consider that his rights have been violated 
or his interests injured by the action of a municipality or the provincial assembly he 
shall have the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress. 
The ministry of justice shall, if so required by the agents of the executive government 
of the colony, prosecute before the courts the boards of aldermen or the provincial 
assembly charged with breaking the law or abusing their power. 
Article 64. In cases referred to in the preceding article, the following courts shall 
have jurisdiction: The Civil Court of the Territorial Audiencia shall try all claims against 
municipalities; and the full bench of the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico shall try all 
claims against the provincial assembly. 
Said courts, when the charges against any of the above-mentioned corporations 
shall be for abuse of power, shall render their decisions by a full bench. From the 
decision of the Territorial Audiencia an appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court 
of the Kingdom. 
Article 65. The redress of grievances which Article 62 grants to any citizen can 
also be had collectively by means of public action, by appointing an attorney or 
representative claimant. 
. 
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Article 66. Without in any way impairing the powers vested in the Governor-
General by Title V of the present decree, he may, whenever he deems fit, appear 
before the Territorial Audiencia of Puerto Rico in his capacity of chief of the executive 
government of the colony, to the end that said court finally decide any conflict of 
jurisdiction between the executive power and the legislative chambers of the colony. 
Article 67. Should any question of jurisdiction be raised between the Insular 
Parliament and the Governor-General in his capacity as representative of the home 
Government, which shall not have been submitted to the Council of Ministers of the 
Kingdom by petition of the Insular Parliament, either party shall have the power to 
bring the matter before the Supreme Court of the Kingdom, which shall render its 
decision by full bench And in the first instance. 
Article 68. The decisions rendered in all cases provided for in the preceding 
articles shall be published in the collection of colonial statutes and shall form part of 
the insular legislation. 
Article 69. Every municipal measure for the purpose of contracting a loan or a 
municipal debt shall be without effect, unless it be assented to by a majority of the 
townspeople whenever one-third of the number of aldermen shall so demand. 
The amount of the loan or debt which, according to the number of inhabitants of a 
township, shall make the referendum proceeding necessary, shall be determined by 
special statute. 
Article 70. All legislative acts originating in the Insular Parliament or the Cortes 
shall be compiled under the title of colonial statutes in a legislative collection, the 
formation and publication of which shall be entrusted to the Governor-General as chief 
of the colonial executive. 
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES. 
Article 1. Until the colonial statutes shall be published in due form, the laws of 
the Kingdom shall be deemed applicable to all matters reserved to the jurisdiction of 
the insular Government. 
Article 2. When the present constitution shall be once approved by the Cortes of 
the Kingdom for the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, it shall not be amended except 
by virtue of a special law and upon the petition of the Insular Parliament. 
Article 3. The provisions of the present decree shall obtain in their entirety in the 
island of Puerto Rico; they shall, however, be ordained by special decree in order to 
conform them to the population and nomenclature of said island. 
Article 4. Pending contracts for public services affecting in common the Antilles 
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and the Peninsula shall continue in their present shape until termination, and shall be 
entirely governed by the conditions and stipulations therein made. 
As regards other contracts already entered into, but not yet in operation, the 
Governor-General shall consult the home Government, or the colonial chambers, as 
the case may be, and the two governments shall by mutual accord decide as between 
themselves the final form of such contract. 
THE AUTONOMICAL CONSTITUTION. 
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. 
Article 1. With a view to carry out the transition from the present regime to the 
system hereby established with the greatest possible dispatch and the least 
interruption of the public business, the Governor-General shall, whenever he deems it 
timely and after consulting the home Government, appoint the secretaries of the 
executive office as per Article 45 of this decree, and with their aid he shall conduct the 
local government of the island until the insular chambers shall have been constituted. 
The secretaries thus appointed shall vacate their offices as soon as the Governor-
General shall take his oath of office before the insular chambers, and the Governor-
General shall immediately appoint as their successors the members of parliament 
who, in his judgment, most fully represent the majorities in the Chamber of 
Representatives and the Council of Administration. 
Article 2. In case that the insular Government may wish to use for other types of 
public works the 250,000 pesos allocated under the law of August 24, 1896 to 
subsidize the narrow-track railroad, it will inform the home Government of what will be 
done. 
Given at the Palace, this 25th day of November, 1897. 
Marfa Cristina. 
Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, 
President of the Council of Ministers 
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APPENDIX 2 
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO1 
We, the people of Puerto Rico, in order to organize ourselves politically on a 
fully democratic basis, to promote the general welfare, and to secure for ourselves and 
our posterity the complete enjoyment of human rights, placing our trust in Almighty 
God, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the commonwealth which, in the 
exercise of our natural rights, we now create within our union with the United States of 
America. 
In so doing, we declare: 
The democratic system is fundamental to the life of the Puerto Rican community; 
We understand that the democratic system of government is one in which the 
will of the people is the source of public power, the political order is subordinate to the 
rights of man, and the free participation of the citizen in collective decisions is assured; 
We consider as determining factors in our life our citizenship of the United 
States of America and our aspiration continually to enrich our democratic heritage in 
the individual and collective enjoyment of its rights and privileges; our loyalty to the 
principles of the Federal Constitution; the existence in Puerto Rico of the two great 
cultures of the American Hemisphere; our fervor for education; our faith in justice; our 
devotion to the courageous, industrious, and peaceful way of life; our fidelity to 
individual human values above and beyond social position, racial differences, and 
economic interests; and our hope for a better world based on these principles. 
ARTICLE 1 
THE COMMONWEALTH 
Section 1. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted. Its political 
power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their will, 
within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and 
the United States of America. 
Section 2. The government of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be 
republican in form and its legislative, judicial and executive branches as established 
by this Constitution shall be equally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of 
1 The text for the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico can be found in Albert P. 
Blauestein and Eric B. Blauestein, eds., Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties. 
(Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1977. 
Puerto Rico. 
Section 3. The political authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall 
extend to the Island of Puerto Rico and to the adjacent islands within its jurisdiction. 
Section 4. The seat of the government shall be the city of San Juan. 
ARTICLE II 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
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Section 1 . The dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal 
before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth, 
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Both the laws and the system 
of public education shall embody these principles of essential human equality. 
Section 2. The laws shall guarantee the expression of the will of the people by 
means of equal, direct and secret universal suffrage and shall protect the citizen 
against any coercion in the exercise of the electoral franchise. 
Section 3. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. There shall be complete separation of church 
and state. 
Section 4. No law shall be made abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances. 
Section 5. Every person has the right to an education which shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. There shall be a system of free and wholly 
non-sectarian public education. Instruction in the elementary and secondary schools 
shall be free and shall be compulsory in the elementary schools to the extent permitted 
by the facilities of the state. No public property or public funds shall be used for the 
support of schools or educational institutions other than those of the state. Nothing 
contained in this provision shall prevent the state from furnishing to any child non-
educational services established by law for the protection or welfare of children. 
Section 6. Persons may join with each other and organize freely for any lawful 
purpose, except in military or quasi-military organizations. 
Section 7. The right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of property is recognized 
as a fundamental right of man. The death penalty shall not exist. No person shall be 
deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law. No person in Puerto 
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Rico shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts shall be enacted. A minimum amount of property and possessions shall 
be exempt from attachment as provided by law. 
Section 8. Every person has the right to the protection of law against abusive 
attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life. 
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except 
upon payment of just compensation and in the manner provided by law. No law shall 
be enacted authorizing condemnation of printing presses, machinery or material 
devoted to publications of any kind. The buildings in which these objects are located 
may be condemned only after a judicial finding of public convenience and necessity 
pursuant to procedure that shall be provided by law, and may be taken before such a 
judicial finding only when there is placed at the disposition of the publication an 
adequate site in which it can be installed and continue to operate for a reasonable 
time. 
Section 10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall no be violated. 
Wire-tapping is prohibited. 
No warrant for arrest or search and seizure shall issue except by judicial 
authority and only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons to be arrested or the 
things to be seized. 
Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the courts. 
Section 11 . In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
have a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation and to have a copy thereof, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, to have 
assistance of counsel, and to be presumed innocent. 
In all prosecutions for a felony the accused shall have the right of trial by an 
impartial jury composed of twelve residents of the district, who may render their verdict 
by a majority vote which in no case may be less than nine. 
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself and the failure of the accused to testify may be neither taken into consideration 
nor commented upon against him. 
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 
Before conviction every accused shall be entitled to be admitted to bail. 
Incarceration prior to trial shall not exceed six months nor shall bail or fines be 
excessive. No person shall be imprisoned for debt. 
Section 12. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except in the 
latter case as a punishment for crime after the accused has been duly convicted. 
Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. Suspension of civil rights 
including the right to vote shall cease upon service of the term of imprisonment 
imposed. 
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be passed. 
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Section 13. The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted without delay and free 
of costs. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless the 
public safety requires it in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion. Only the 
Legislative Assembly shall have the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus and the laws regulating its issuance. 
The military authority shall always be subordinate to civil authority. 
Section 14. No titles of nobility or other hereditary honors shall be granted. No 
officer or employee of the Commonwealth shall accept gifts, donation, decorations or 
offices from any foreign country or officer without prior authorization by the Legislative 
Assembly. 
Section 15. The employment of children less than fourteen years of age in any 
occupation which is prejudicial to their health or morals or which places them in 
jeopardy of life or limb is prohibited. 
No child less than sixteen years of age shall be kept in custody in a jail or 
penitentiary. 
Section 16. The right of every employee to choose his occupation freely and to 
resign therefrom is recognized, as is his right to equal pay for equal work, to a 
reasonable minimum salary, to protection against risks to his health or person in his 
work or employment, and to an ordinary workday which shall not exceed eight hours. 
An employee may work in excess of this daily limit only if he is paid extra 
compensation as provided by law, at a rate never less than one and one-half times the 
regular rate at which he is employed. 
Section 17. Persons employed by private businesses, enterprises and 
individual employers and by agencies or instrumentalities of the government operating 
as private businesses or enterprises, shall have the right to organize and to bargain 
collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choosing in 
order to promote their welfare. 
Section 18. In order to assure their right to organize and to bargain collectively, 
persons employed by private businesses, enterprises and individual employers and 
by agencies, enterprises and individual employers and by agencies or 
instrumentalities of the government operating as private businesses or enterprises, in 
their direct relation with their own employers shall have the right to strike, to picket and 
to engage in other legal concerted activities. 
Nothing herein contained shall impair the authority of the Legislative Assembly 
to enact laws to deal with grave emergencies that clearly imperil the public health or 
safety or essential public services. 
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Section 19. The foregoing enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
restrictively nor does it contemplate the exclusion of other rights not specifically 
mentioned which belong to the people in a democracy. The power of the Legislative 
Assembly to enact laws for the protection of the life, health and general welfare of the 
people shall likewise no be construed restrictively. 
ARTICLE Ill 
THE LEGISLATURE 
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a Legislative Assembly, 
which shall consist of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
whose members shall be elected by direct vote at each general election. 
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-seven Senators and the 
House of Representatives of fifty-one Representatives, except as these numbers may 
be increases in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of this Article. 
Section 3. for the purpose of election of members of the Legislative Assembly, 
Puerto Rico shall be divided into eight senatorial districts and forty representative 
districts. Each senatorial district shall elect two Senators and each representative 
district one Representative. 
There shall also be eleven Senators and eleven Representatives elected at 
large. No elector may vote for more that one candidate for Senator at Large or for 
more than one candidate for Representative at Large. 
Section 4. In the first and subsequent elections under this Constitution the 
division of senatorial and representative districts as provided in Article VI 11 shall be in 
effect. After each decennial census beginning with the year 1960, said division shall 
be revised by a Board composed of the Chef Justice of the Supreme Court as 
Chairman and of two additional members appointed by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The two additional members shall not belong to the same 
political party. Any revision shall maintain the number of senatorial and representative 
districts here created, which shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory 
and shall be organized, insofar as practicable, upon the basis of population and 
means of communication. Each senatorial district shall always include five 
representative districts. 
The decisions of the Board shall be made by majority vote and shall take effect 
in the general elections next following each revision. The Board shall cease to exist 
after the completion of each revision. 
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Section 5. No person shall be a member of the Legislative Assembly unless he 
is able to read and write the Spanish or English language and unless he is a citizen of 
the United States and of Puerto Rico and has resided in Puerto Rico at least two years 
immediately prior to the date of his election or appointment. No person shall be a 
member of the Senate who is not over thirty years of age, and no person shall be a 
member of the House of Representatives who is not over twenty-five years of age. 
Section 6. No person shall be eligible to election or appointment as Senator or 
Representative for a district unless he has resided therein at least one year 
immediately prior to his election or appointment. When there is more than one 
representative district in a municipality, residence in the municipality shall satisfy this 
requirement. 
Section 7. If in a general election more than two-thirds of the members of either 
house are elected from one political party or from a single ticket, as both are defined 
by law, the number of members shall be increased in the following cases: 
(a) If the party or ticket which elected more than two-thirds of the members of 
either or both houses shall have obtained less than two-thirds of the total number of 
votes cast for the office of Governor, the number of members of the Senate or of the 
House of Representatives or of both bodies, whichever may be the case, shall be 
increased by declaring elected a sufficient number of candidates of the minority party 
or parties to bring the total number of members of the minority party or parties to nine 
in the Senate and to seventeen in the House of Representatives. when there is more 
than one minority party, said additional members shall be declared elected from 
among the candidates of each minority party in the proportion that the number of votes 
cast for the candidate of each of said parties for the office of governor bears to the total 
number of votes cast for the candidates of all the minority parties for the office of 
Governor. 
When one or more minority parties shall have obtained representation in a 
proportion equal to or greater than the proportion of votes received by their respective 
candidates for Governor, such party or parties shall not be entitled to additional 
members until the representation established for each of the other minority parties 
under these provisions shall have been completed. 
(b) If the party or ticket which elected more than two-thirds of the members of 
either or both houses shall have obtained more than two-thirds of the total number of 
votes cast for the office of Governor, and one or more minority parties shall not have 
elected the number of members in the Senate or in the House of Representatives or in 
both houses, whichever may be the case, which corresponds to the proportion of votes 
cast by each of them for the office of Governor, such additional number of their 
candidates shall be declared elected as is necessary in order to complete said 
proportion as nearly as possible, but the number of Senators of all the minority parties 
shall never, under this provision, be more than nine or that of Representatives more 
than seventeen. 
In order to select additional members of the Legislative Assembly from a 
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minority party in accordance with these provisions, its candidates at large who have 
not been elected shall be the first to be declared elected in the order of the votes that 
they have obtained, and thereafter its district candidates who, not having been elected, 
have obtained in their respective districts the highest proportion of the total number of 
votes cast as compared to the proportion of votes cast in favor of other candidates of 
the same party not elected to an equal office in the other districts. 
The additional Senators and Representatives whose election is declared under 
this section shall be considered for all purposes as Senators at Large or 
Representatives at Large. 
The measures necessary to implement these guarantees, the method of 
adjudicating fractions that may result from the application of the rules contained in this 
section, and the minimum number of votes that a minority party must cast in favor of its 
candidate for Governor in order to have the right to the representation provided herein 
shall be determined by the Legislative Assembly. 
Section 8. The term of office of Senators and Representatives shall begin on 
the second day of January immediately following the date of the general election in 
which they shall have been elected. If, prior to the fifteen months immediately 
preceding the date of the next general election, a vacancy occurs in the office of 
Senator Or Representative for a district, the Governor shall call a special election in 
said district within thirty days following the date on which the vacancy occurs. This 
election shall be held not later than ninety days after the call, and the person elected 
shall hold office for the rest of the unexpired term of his predecessor. When said 
vacancy occurs during a legislative session, or when the Legislative Assembly or the 
Senate has been called for a date prior to the certification of the results of the special 
election, the presiding officer of the appropriate house shall fill said vacancy by 
appointing the person recommended by the central committee of the political party of 
which his predecessor in office was a member. Such person shall hold the office until 
certification of the election of the candidate who was elected. When the vacancy 
occurs within fifteen months prior to a general election, or when it occurs in the office of 
a Senator at Large or a Representative at Large, the presiding officer of the 
appropriate house shall fill it, upon the recommendation of the political party of which 
the previous holder of the office was member, by appointing a person selected in the 
same manner as that in which his predecessor was selected. A vacancy in the office 
of a Senator at Large or a Representative at Large elected as an independent 
candidate shall be filled by an election in all districts. 
Section 9. Each house shall be the judge of the election, returns and 
qualifications of its members; shall choose its own officers; shall adopt rules for its own 
proceedings appropriate to legislative bodies; and, with the concurrence of three-
fourths of the total number of members of which it is composed, may expel any 
member for the causes established in Section 21 of this Article, authorizing 
impeachments. The Senate shall elect a President and the House of Representatives 
a Speaker from among their respective members. 
Section 1 0. The Legislative Assembly shall be deemed a continuous body 
during the term for which its members are elected and shall meet in regular session 
each year commencing on the second Monday in January. The duration of regular 
sessions and the periods of time for introduction and consideration of bills shall be 
prescribed by law. When the Governor calls the Legislative Assembly into special 
session it may consider only those matters specified in the call or in any special 
message sent to it by him during the session. No special session shall continue 
longer than twenty calendar days. 
Section 11. The sessions of each house shall be open. 
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Section 12. A majority of the total number of members of which each house is 
composed shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to 
day and shall have authority to compel the attendance of absent members. 
Section 13. The two houses shall meet in the capitol of Puerto Rico and neither 
of them may adjourn for more than three consecutive days without the consent of the 
other. 
Section 14. No member of the Legislative Assembly shall be arrested while the 
house of which he is a member is in session, or during the fifteen days before or after 
such session, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace. The members of the 
Legislative Assembly shall not be questioned in any other place for any speech, 
debate or vote in either house or in any committee. 
Section 15. No Senator or Representative may, during the term for which he 
was elected or chosen, be appointed to any civil office in the Government of Puerto 
Rico, its municipalities or instrumentalities, which shall have been created or the salary 
of which shall have been increased during said term. No person may hold office in the 
Government of Puerto Rico, its municipalities or instrumentalities and be a Senator or 
Representative at the same time. These provisions shall not prevent a member of the 
Legislative Assembly from being designated to perform functions ad honorem. 
Section 16. The Legislative Assembly shall have the power to create, 
consolidate or reorganize executive departments and to define their functions. 
Section 17. No bill shall become a law unless it has been printed, read, 
referred to a committee and returned therefrom with a written report, but either house 
may discharge a committee from the study and report of any bill and proceed to the 
consideration thereof. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and of the 
votes cast for and against bills. The legislative proceedings shall be publishes in a 
daily record in the form determined by law. Every bill, except general appropriation 
bills, shall be confined to one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, and 
any part of an act whose subject has not been expressed in the title shall be void. The 
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general appropriation act shall contain only appropriations and rules for their 
disbursement. No bill shall be amended in a manner that changes its original purpose 
or incorporates matters extraneous to it. In amending any article or section of a law, 
said article or section shall be promulgated in its entirety as amended. All bills for 
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may 
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. 
Section 18. The subjects which may be dealt with by means of joint resolution 
shall be determined by law, but every joint resolution shall follow the same legislative 
process as that of a bill. 
Section 19. Every bill which is approved by a majority of the total number of 
members of which each house is composed shall be submitted to the Governor and 
shall become law if he signs it or if he does not return it, with his objections, to the 
house in which it originated within ten days. (Sundays excepted) counted from the 
date on which he shall have received it. 
When the Governor returns a bill the house that receives it shall enter his 
objections on its journal and both houses may reconsider it. If approved by two-thirds 
of the total number of members of which each house is composed, said bill shall 
become law. 
If the Legislative Assembly adjourns sine die before the Governor has acted on 
a bill that has been presented to him less than ten days before, he is relieved of the 
obligation of returning it with his objections and the bill shall become law only if the 
Governor signs it within thirty days after receiving it. 
Every final passage or reconsideration of a bill shall be by a roll-call vote. 
Section 20. In approving any appropriation bill that contains more than one 
item, the Governor may eliminate one or more of such items or reduce their amounts, 
at the same time reducing the total amounts involved. 
Section 21 . The House of Representatives shall have exclusive power to 
initiate impeachment proceedings and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the total 
number of members of which it is composed, to bring and indictment. The Senate 
shall have exclusive power to try and to decide impeachment cases, and in meeting 
for such purposes the Senators shall act in the name of the people and under oath or 
affirmation. No judgment of conviction in an impeachment trial shall be pronounced 
without the concurrence of three-fourths of the total number of members of which the 
Senate is composed, and the judgment shall be limited to removal from office. The 
person impeached, however, may be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment 
and punishment according to law. The causes of impeachment shall be treason, 
bribery, other felonies, and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court shall preside at the impeachment trial of the Governor. 
The two houses may conduct impeachment proceedings in their regular or 
special sessions. The presiding officers of the two houses, upon written request of 
two-thirds of the total number of members of which the House of Representatives is 
composed, must convene them to deal with such proceedings. 
Section 22. The Governor shall appoint a Controller with the advice and 
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consent of a majority of the total number of members of which each house is 
composed. The Controller shall meet the requirements prescribed by law and shall 
hold office for a term of ten yeas and until his successor has been appointed and 
qualifies. The Controller shall audit all the revenues, accounts and expenditures of the 
Commonwealth, of its agencies and instrumentalities and of its municipalities, in order 
to determine whether they have been made in accordance with law. He shall render 
annual reports and any special reports that may be required of him by the Legislative 
Assembly or by the Governor. 
In the performance of his duties the Controller shall be authorized to administer 
oaths, take evidence and compel under pain of contempt, the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of books, letters, documents, papers, records and all other articles 
deemed essential to a full understanding of the matter under investigation. 
The Controller may be removed for the causes and pursuant to the procedure 
established in the preceding section. 
ARTICLE IV 
THE EXECUTIVE 
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a Governor, who shall be 
elected by direct vote in each general election. 
Section 2. The Governor shall hold office for the term of four years from the 
second day of January of the year following his election and until his successor has 
been elected and qualifies. He shall reside in Puerto Rico and maintain his office in its 
capital city. 
Section 3. No person shall be Governor unless, on the date of the election, he 
is at least thirty-five years of age, and is and has been during the preceding five years 
a citizen of the United States and a citizen and bona fide resident of Puerto Rico. 
Section 4. The Governor shall execute the laws and cause them to be 
executed. 
He shall call the Legislative Assembly or the Senate into special session when 
in his judgment the public interest so requires. 
He shall appoint, in the manner prescribed by this Constitution or by law, all 
officers whose appointment he is authorized to make. He shall have the power to 
make appointments while the Legislative Assembly is not in session. Any such 
appointments that require the advice and consent of the Senate or of both houses 
shall expire at the end of the next regular session. 
93 
He shall be the commander-in-chief of the militia. 
He shall have the power to call out the militia and summon the posse comitatus 
in order to prevent or suppress rebellion, invasion or any serious disturbance of the 
public peace. 
He shall have the power to proclaim martial law when the public safety requires 
it in case of rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof. The Legislative 
Assembly shall meet forthwith on their own initiative to ratify or revoke the 
proclamation. 
He shall have the power to suspend the execution of sentences in criminal 
cases and to grant pardons, commutations of punishment, and total or partial 
remissions of fines and forfeitures for crimes committed in violation of the laws of 
Puerto Rico. This power shall not extend to cases of impeachment. 
He shall approve or disapprove in accordance with this Constitution the joint 
resolutions and bills passed by the Legislative Assembly. 
He shall present to the Legislative Assembly, at the beginning of each regular 
session, a message concerning the affairs of the Commonwealth and a report 
concerning the state of the Treasury of Puerto Rico and the proposed expenditures for 
the ensuing fiscal year. Said report shall contain the information necessary for the 
formulation of a program of legislation. 
He shall exercise the other powers and functions and discharge the other duties 
assigned to him by this Constitution or by law. 
Section 5. For the purpose of exercising executive power, the Governor shall 
be assisted by Secretaries whom he shall appoint with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. the appointment of the Secretary of State shall in addition require the advice 
and consent of the House of Representatives, and the person appointed shall fulfill the 
requirements established in Section 3 of this article. The Secretaries shall collectively 
constitute the Governor's advisory council, which shall be designated as the Council of 
Secretaries. 
Section 6. Without prejudice to the power of the Legislative Assembly to create, 
reorganize and consolidate executive departments and to define their function, the 
following departments are hereby established: State, Justice, Education, Health, 
Treasury, Labor, Agriculture and Commerce, and Public Works. Each of these 
executive departments shall be headed by a Secretary. 
Section 7. When a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor, caused by death, 
resignation, removal, total and permanent incapacity, or any other absolute disability, 
said office shall devolve upon the Secretary of State, who shall hold it for the rest of 
the term and until a new Governor has been elected and qualifies. In the event that 
vacancies exist at the same time in both the office of Governor and that of Secretary of 
State, the law shall provide which of the secretaries shall serve as Governor. 
Section 8. When for any reason the Governor is temporarily unable to perform 
f 
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his functions, the Secretary of State shall substitute for him during the period he is 
unable to serve. If for any reason the secretary of State is no available, the Secretary 
determined by law shall temporarily hold the office of Governor. 
Section 9. If the Governor-elect shall not have qualified or if he has qualified 
and a permanent vacancy occurs in the off ice of Governor before he shall have 
appointed a Secretary of State, or before said Secretary, having been appointed, shall 
brave qualified, the Legislative Assembly just elected, upon convening for its first 
regular session, shall elect, by a majority of the total number of members of which 
each house is composed, a Governor who shall hold office until his successor is 
elected in the next general election and qualifies. 
Section 1 O. The Governor may be removed for the causes and pursuant to the 
procedure established in Section 21 of Article Ill of this Constitution. 
ARTICLE V 
THE JUDICIARY 
Section 1 . The judicial power of Puerto Rico shall be vested in a Supreme 
Court, and in such other courts as may be established by law. 
Section 2. The courts of Puerto Rico shall constitute a unified judicial system for 
purposes of jurisdiction, operation and administration. The Legislative Assembly may 
create and abolish courts, except for the Supreme Court, in a manner not consistent 
with this Constitution, and shall determine the venue and organization of the courts. 
Section 3. The Supreme Court shall be the court of last resort in Puerto Rico 
and shall be composed of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. The number of 
Justices may be changed only by law upon request of the Supreme Court. 
Section 4. The Supreme Court shall sit, in accordance with rules adopted by it, 
as a full court or in divisions composed of not less than three Justices. No law shall be 
held unconstitutional except by a majority of the total number of Justices of which the 
Court is composed in accordance with this Constitution or with law. [As amended in 
General Election of Nov. 8, 1960.] 
Section 5. The Supreme Court, any of its divisions, or any of its Justices may 
hear in the first instance petitions for habeas corpus and any other courses and 
proceedings as determined by law. 
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall adopt for the courts rules of evidence and 
of civil and criminal procedure which shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the 
substantive rights of the parties. The rules thus adopted shall be submitted to the 
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Legislative Assembly at the beginning of its next regular session and shall not go into 
effect until sixty days after the close of said session, unless disapproved by the 
Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power both at said session and 
subsequently to amend, repeal or supplement any of said rules by a specific law to 
that effect. 
Section 7. The Supreme Court shall adopt rules for the administration of the 
courts. These rules shall be subject to the laws concerning procurement, personnel, 
audit and appropriation of funds, and other laws which apply generally to all branches 
of the government. The Chief Justice shall direct the administration of the courts and 
shall appoint an administrative director who shall hold office at the will of the Chief 
Justice. 
Section 8. Judges shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Justices of the Supreme Court shall not assume office until 
after confirmation by the Senate and shall hold their offices during good behavior. The 
terms of office of the other judges shall be fixed by law and shall not be less than that 
fixed for the terms of office of a judge of the same or equivalent category existing when 
this Constitution takes effect. The other officials and employees of the courts shall be 
appointed in the manner provided by law. 
Section 9. No person shall be appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court unless 
he is a citizen of the United States and of Puerto Rico, shall have been admitted to the 
practice of law in Puerto Rico at least ten years prior to his appointment, and shall 
have resided in Puerto Rico at least five years immediately prior thereto. 
Section 10. The Legislative Assembly shall establish a retirement system for 
judges. Retirement shall be compulsory at the age of seventy years. 
Section 11 . Justices of the Supreme Court may be removed for the causes and 
pursuant to the procedure established in Section 21 of Article 111 of this Constitution. 
Judges of the other courts may be removed by the Supreme Court for the causes and 
pursuant to the procedure provided by law. 
Section 12. No judge shall make a direct or indirect financial contribution to any 
political organization or party, or hold any executive office therein, or participate in a 
political campaign of any kind, or be a candidate for an elective public office unless he 
has resigned his judicial office at least six months prior to his nomination. 
Section 13. In the event that a court or any of its divisions or sections is 
changed or abolished by law, the person holding a post of judge therein shall continue 
to hold it during the rest of the term for which he was appointed and shall perform the 
judicial functions assigned to him by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
ARTICLE VI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
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Section 1. The Legislative Assembly shall have the power to create, abolish 
consolidate and reorganize municipalities; to change their territorial limits; to 
determine their organization and functions; and to authorize them to develop programs 
for the general welfare and to create any agencies necessary for that purpose. 
No law abolishing or consolidating municipalities shall take effect until ratified in 
a referendum by a majority of the qualified electors voting in said referendum in each 
of the municipalities to be abolished or consolidated. The referendum shall be 
conducted in the manner determined by law, which shall include the applicable 
procedures of the election laws in effect when the referendum law is approved. 
Section 2. The power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to impose and 
collect taxes and to authorize their imposition and collection by municipalities shall be 
exercised as determined by the Legislative Assembly and shall never be surrendered 
or suspended. The power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to contract and to 
authorize the contracting of debts shall be exercised as determined by the Legislative 
Assembly, but no direct obligations of the Commonwealth for money borrowed directly 
by the Commonwealth evidenced by bonds or notes for the payment of which the full 
faith credit and taxing power of the Commonwealth shall be pledged shall be issued 
by the Commonwealth if the total of (i) the amount of principal of and interest on such 
bonds and notes, together with the amount of principal of and interest on all such 
bonds and notes theretofore issued by the Commonwealth and then outstanding, 
payable in any fiscal year and (ii) any amounts paid by the Commonwealth in the fiscal 
year next preceding the then current fiscal year for principal or interest on account of 
any outstanding obligations evidenced by bonds or notes guaranteed by the 
commonwealth, shall exceed 15% of the average of the total amount of the annual 
revenues raised under the provisions of commonwealth legislation and covered into 
the Treasury of Puerto Rico in the two fiscal years next preceding the then current 
fiscal year; and no such bonds or notes issued by the Commonwealth for any purpose 
other than housing facilities shall mature later than 30 years from their date and no 
bonds or notes issued for housing facilities shall mature later than 40 years from their 
date; and the Commonwealth shall not guarantee any obligations evidenced by bonds 
or notes if the total of the amount payable in any fiscal year on account of principal of 
and interest on all the direct obligations referred to above theretofore issued by the 
Commonwealth and then outstanding and the amounts referred to in item (ii) above 
shall exceed 15 percent of the average of the total amount of such annual revenues. 
The Legislative Assembly shall fix limitations for the issuance of direct 
obligations by any of the municipalities of Puerto Rico for money borrowed directly by 
such municipality evidenced by bonds or notes for the payment of which the full faith, 
credit and taxing power of such municipality shall be pledged provided, however, that 
no such bonds or notes shall be issued by any municipality in an amount which 
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together with the amount of all such bonds and notes theretofore issued by such 
municipality and then outstanding, shall exceed the percentage determined by the 
Legislative Assembly, which shall be not less than five per centum (5%) nor more than 
ten per centum (10%) of the aggregate tax valuation of the property within such 
municipality. 
The Secretary of the Treasury may be required to apply the available revenues 
including surplus to the payment of interest on the public debt and the amortization 
thereof in any case provided for by Section 8 of this Article VI at the suit of any holder 
of bonds or notes issued in evidence thereof. 
[As amended by the voters at a referendum held Dec. 10, 1961.] 
Section 3. The rule of taxation in Puerto Rico shall be uniform. 
Section 4. General elections shall be held every tour years on the day of 
November determined by the Legislative Assembly. In said elections there shall be 
elected a Governor, the members of the Legislative Assembly, and the other officials 
whose election on that date is provided tor by law. 
Every person over twenty-one years of age shall be entitled to vote it he fulfills 
the other conditions determined by law. No person shall be deprived of the right to 
vote because he does not know how to read or write or does not own property. 
All matters concerning the electoral process, registration of voters, political 
parties and candidates shall be determined by law. 
Every popularly elected official shall be elected by direct vote and any 
candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate for the same office shall 
be declared elected. 
Section 5. The laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by law and shall specify the terms under which they shall take effect. 
Section 6. If at the end of any fiscal year the appropriations necessary for the 
ordinary operating expenses of the Government and tor the payment of interest on and 
amortization of the public debt tor the ensuing fiscal year shall not have been made, 
the several sums appropriated in the last appropriation acts tor the objects and 
purposes therein specified, so tar as the same may be applicable, shall continue in 
effect item by item, and the Governor shall authorize the payments necessary for such 
purposes until corresponding appropriations are made. 
Section 7. The appropriations made tor any fiscal year shall not exceed the 
total revenues, including available surplus, estimated for said fiscal year unless the 
imposition of taxes sufficient to cover said appropriations is provided by law. 
Section 8. In case the valuable revenues including surplus tor any fiscal year 
are insufficient to meet the appropriations made tor that year, interest on the public 
debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other disbursements shall 
thereafter be made in accordance with the order of priorities established by law. 
Section 9. Public property and funds shall only be disposed of for public 
purposes, for the support and operation of state institutions, and pursuant to law. 
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Section 10. No law shall give extra compensation to any public officer, 
employee, agent or contractor after services shall have been rendered or contract 
made. No law shall extend the term of any public officer or diminish his salary or 
emoluments after his election or appointment. No person shall draw a salary for more 
than one office or position in the government of Puerto Rico. 
Section 11 . The salaries of the Governor, the Secretaries, the members of the 
Legislative Assembly, the Controller and Judges shall be fixed by a special law and, 
except for the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly, shall not be 
decreased during the terms for which they are elected or appointed. The salaries of 
the Governor and the controller shall not be increased during said terms. No increase 
in the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly shall take effect until the 
expiration of the term of the Legislative Assembly during which it is enacted. Any 
reduction of the salaries of the members of the Legislative Assembly shall be effective 
only during the term of the Legislative Assembly which approves it. 
Section 12. The Governor shall occupy and use, free of rent, the buildings and 
properties belonging to the Commonwealth which have been or shall hereafter be 
used and occupied by him as chief executive. 
Section 13. The procedure for granting franchises, rights, privileges and 
concessions of a public or quasi-public nature shall be determined by law, but every 
concession of this kind to a person or private entity must be approved by the Governor 
or by the executive official whom he designates. Every franchise, right, privilege or 
concession of a public or quasi-public nature shall be subject to amendment, 
alteration or repeal as determined by law. 
Section 14. No corporation shall be authorized to conduct the business of 
buying and selling real estate or be permitted to hold or own real estate except such 
as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it was 
created, and every corporation authorized to engage in agriculture shall by its charter 
be restricted to the ownership and control of not to exceed five hundred acres of land; 
and this provision shall be held to prevent any member of a corporation engaged in 
agriculture from being in any wise interested in any other corporation engaged in 
agriculture. 
Corporation, however, may loan funds upon real estate security, and purchase 
real estate when necessary for the collection of loans, but they shall dispose of real 
estate so obtained within five years after receiving the title. 
Corporations not organized in Puerto Rico, but doing business in Puerto Rico, 
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shall be bound by the provisions of this section so far as they are applicable. 
These provisions shall not prevent the ownership, possession or management 
of lands in excess of five hundred acres by the Commonwealth, its agencies or 
instrumentalities. 
Section 15. The Legislative Assembly shall determine all matters concerning 
the flag, the seal and the anthem of the Commonwealth. Once determined, no law 
changing them shall take effect until one year after the general election next following 
the date of enactment of said law. 
Section 16. All public officials and employees of the Commonwealth, its 
agencies, instrumentalities and political subdivisions, before entering upon their 
respective duties, shall take oath to support the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
Section 17. In case of invasion, rebellion, epidemic or any other event giving 
rise to a state of emergency, the Governor may call the Legislative Assembly to meet in 
a place other than the Capitol of Puerto Rico, subject to the approval or disapproval of 
the Legislative Assembly. Under the same conditions, the Governor may, during the 
period of emergency, order the government, its agencies and instrumentalities to be 
moved temporarily to a place other than the seat of the government. 
Section 18. All criminal actions in the courts of the Commonwealth shall be 
conducted in the name and by the authority of "The People of Puerto Rico" until 
otherwise provided by law. 
Section 19. It shall be the public policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, 
develop and use its natural resources in the most effective manner possible for the 
general welfare of the community; to conserve and maintain buildings and places 
declared by the Legislative Assembly to be of historic or artistic value; to regulate its 
penal institutions in a manner that effectively achieves their purposes and to provide, 
within the limits of available resources, for adequate treatment of delinquents in order 
to make possible their moral and social rehabilitation. 
ARTICLE VII 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
Section 1. The Legislative Assembly may propose amendments to this 
Constitution by a concurrent resolution approved by not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of which each house is composed. All proposed amendments 
shall be submitted to the qualified electors in a special referendum, but if the 
concurrent resolution is approved by not less than three-fourths of the total number of 
members of which each house is composed, the Legislative Assembly may provide 
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that the referendum shall be held at the same time as the next general election. Each 
proposed amendment shall be voted on separately and not more than three proposed 
amendments may be submitted at the same referendum. Every proposed amendment 
shall specify the terms under which it shall take effect, and it shall become a part of this 
Constitution if it is ratified by a majority of the electors voting thereon. Once approved 
a proposed amendment must be published at least three months prior to the date of 
the referendum. 
Section 2. The Legislative Assembly, by a concurrent resolution approved two-
thirds of the total number of members of which each house is compose, may submit to 
the qualified electors at a referendum, held at the same time as a general election, the 
question of whether a constitutional convention shall be called to revise this 
Constitution. If a majority of the electors voting on this question vote in favor of the 
revision, it shall be made by a Constitutional Convention elected in the manner 
provided by law. Every revision of this Constitution shall be submitted to the qualified 
electors at a special referendum for ratification or rejection by a majority of the votes 
cast at the referendum. 
Section 3. No amendment to this Constitution shall alter the republican form of 
government established by it or abolish its bill of rights. Any amendment or revision of 
this constitution shall be consistent with the resolution enacted by the Congress of the 
United States approving this constitution, with the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States, with the Puerto Rican Federai Relations Act and with 
Pubiic Law 600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature of a compact. 
ARTiCLE VIII 
SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS 
Section 1. The senatorial and representative districts shall be the following: 
I. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF SAN JUAN, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 1 . - The Capital of Puerto Rico, excluding the 
present electoral precincts of Santurce and Rio Piedras; 2. - Electoral zones numbers 
1 and 2 of the present precinct of Santurce; 3. - Electoral zone number 3 of the present 
precinct of Santurce; 4. - Electoral zone number 4 of the present precinct of Santurce; 
and 5. - Wards Hato Rey, Puerto Nuevo and Caparra Heights of the Capital of Puerto 
Rico. 
II. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF BAYAMON, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 6. - The municipality of Bayamon; 7. - The 
municipalities of Carolina and Trujillo Alto; 8. - The present electoral precinct of Rfo 
Piedras, excluding wards Hato Rey, Puerto Nuevo and Caparra Heights of the Capital 
of Puerto Rico; 9. - The municipalities of Catano, Guaynabo and Toa Baja; and 10. -
The municipalities of Toa Alta, Corozal and Naranjito. 
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111. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF ARECIBO, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 11. - The municipalities of Vega Baja, Vega Alta and 
Dorado; 12. - The municipalities of Manatf and Barceloneta; 13. - The municipalities of 
Ciales and Morovis; 14. - The municipality of Arecibo; and 15. - The municipality of 
Utuado. 
IV. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF AGUADILLA, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 16. - The municipalities of Camuy, Hatillo and 
Quebradillas; 17. - The municipalities of Aguadilla and lsabela; 18. - The 
municipalities of San Sebastian and Moca; 19. - The municipalities of Lares, Las 
Marf as and Maricao; and 20. - The municipalities of Aiiasco, Aguada and Rinc6n. 
V. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF MAYAGOEZ, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 21. - The municipality of Mayag0ez; 22. - The 
municipalities of Cabo Rojo, Hormigueros and Lajas; 23. - The municipalities of San 
German and Sabana Grande; 24. - The municipalities of Yauco and Guanica; and 25. 
- The municipalities of Guayanilla and Penuelas. 
VI. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF PONCE, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 26. - The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
wards and the City Beach of the municipality of Ponce; 27. - The municipality of Ponce, 
except for the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth wards and the City Beach; 28. -
The municipalities of Adjuntas and Jayuya; 29. - The municipalities Juana Diaz, Santa 
Isabel and Villalba; and 30. - The municipalities of Coamo and Orocovis. 
VII. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF GUAYAMA, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 31. - The municipalities of Aibonito, Barranquitas 
and Comerfo; 32. - The municipalities of Cayey and Cidra; 33. - The municipalities of 
Caguas and Aguas Buenas; 34. - The municipalities of Guayama and Salinas; and 35. 
- The municipalities of Patillas, Maunabo and Arroyo. 
VIII. SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF HUMACAO, which shall be composed of the 
following Representative Districts: 36. - The municipalities of Humacao and Yabucoa; 
37. - The municipalities of Juncos, Gurabo and San Lorenzo; 38. - The municipalities 
of Naguabo, Ceiba and Las Piedras; 39. - The municipalities of Fajardo and Vieques 
and the Island of Culebra; and 40. - The municipalities of Rfo Grande, and Lofza and 
Luquillo. 
Section 2. Electoral zones numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 included in three 
representative districts within the senatorial district of San Juan are those presently 
existing for purposes of electoral organization in the second precinct of San Juan. 
ARTICLE IX 
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 
Section 1 . When this Constitution goes into effect all laws not inconsistent 
therewith shall continue in full force until amended or repealed, or until they expire by 
their own terms. 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution, civil and criminal liabilities, 
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rights, franchises, concessions, privileges, claims, actions, causes of action, contracts, 
and civil criminal and administrative proceedings shall continue unaffected, 
notwithstanding the taking effect of this Constitution. 
Section 2. All officers who are in office by election or appointment on the date 
this Constitution takes effect shall continue to hold their offices and to perform the 
functions thereof in a manner no inconsistent with this Constitution, unless the 
functions of their offices are abolished or until their successors are selected and 
qualify in accordance with this Constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto. 
Section 3. Notwithstanding the age limit fixed by this Constitution for 
compulsory retirement, all the judges of the courts of Puerto Rico who are holding 
office on the date this Constitution takes effect shall continue to hold their judicial 
offices until the expiration of the terms for which they were appointed, and in the case 
of Justices of the Supreme Court during good behavior. 
Section 4. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be the successor of the 
People of Puerto Rico for all purposes, including without limitation the collection and 
payments of debts and liabilities in accordance with their terms. 
Section 5. When this constitution goes into effect, the term "citizen of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" shall replace the term "citizen of Puerto Rico" as 
previously used. 
Section 6. Political parties shall continue to enjoy all rights recognized by the 
election law, provided that on the effective date of this Constitution they fulfill the 
minimum requirements for the registration of new parties contained in said law. Five 
years after this Constitution shall have taken effect the Legislative Assembly may 
change these requirements, but any law increasing them shall not go into effect until 
after the general election next following its enactment. 
Section 7. The Legislative Assembly may enact the laws necessary to 
supplement and make effective these transitory provisions in order to assure the 
functioning of the government until the officers provided for by this Constitution are 
elected or appointed and qualify, and until this Constitution takes effect in all respects. 
Section 8. If the Legislative Assembly creates a Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Agriculture and Commerce shall thereafter be called the Department of 
Agriculture. 
Section 9. The first election under the provisions of this Constitution shall be 
held on the date provided by law, but not later than six months after the effective date 
of this Constitution. The second general election under this Constitution shall be held 
in the month of November 1956 on a day provided by law. 
103 
Section 10. This Constitution shall take effect when the Governor so proclaims, 
but not later than sixty days after its ratification by the Congress of the United States. 
Done in Convention, at San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, on the sixth day of February, in the year 
of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and 
fifty-two. 
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